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Abstract
Sarris considers  the benefit  to agricultural  producers of  Living Standards  Survev data to specify variouS  classes of
commodity  price  insuranlcc  that provides  in every  ycar-  cocoa-producing  houselholds and  moithly  price  data  for
but in  advance  of the  resolutioll  of productioni  and  price  both  domestic  and international  prices,  to formulate
uncertainity-a  niinimuli-  price  for  a  fixed or variablc  appropriate  models for  ascertaining  price  risks faced  by
portionl  of production.  Under  the assuLIMption  that  producers. The author gives  empirical  estimates  of the
producers  do  not chanigc their  long term  productioll and  actuarially  fair premium,  and shiows  that they arc  smaller
incomic  cliversification patteril,  the author- suggcsts  a  than  markct-based  put option  prices from  organized
theoretical  framework  that  leads  til  explicit  fornitilas of  exchianiges.  rhe overall  bencfit  in providing  minimum
the benefit in  providing this  type of insuraice.  He  shows  price  insurance  to houselholds,  however,  turnis out to be
that this beniefit depends  not only on the  actuarially  fair  sUbstantially  highier thanl  the acttiarially  fair premitinis
instirance  premium,  but also  oln  hoIselhold-specific  and the  market-based  ptIt  option priccs.  This  is due  to
factors that depcnd  on  the  attitudes to risk,  the  both the magnitude  of the uncertainities  facing the
consumption  smoothinig  parameters,  and the  liouselhold-  households,  as well as  their  risk and  consumilption
specific  cxposures to income risks. The author  applies  smoothinig behavior.
the  theoretical  framework  for GChana,  usinig  the  GhalLaL
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Agricultural  producers  around the world are  exposed to a variety of income  uncertainties,  both
market related,  such as price variations,  as well as non-market  related, such as unstable weather
patterns.  It is well known that such uncertainties  induce  substantial  income risks, and these can
be particularly detrimental  to small and/or poor producers in developing  countries. It is also well
known  that  farmers have  developed  several ways  for dealing  with the various risks  they face.
These  involve risk management  strategies,  namely  actions  taken ahead of the resolution  of any
uncertainty  to improve the ex-ante exposure of the producer's  household  to various risks, as well
as risk coping strategies, namely rules adopted ex-ante to help the household to deal ex-post with
any  undesirable  consequences.  Risk  management  strategies  include  among  others  crop
diversification,  income  diversification through  off-farm  work, sharecropping,  etc.  Such ex-ante
strategies  are usually  designed  to  sacrifice  higher  expected  income  for a more  stable  income
stream  Risk  coping  strategies  may  include  the  availability  of short  term  consumption  credit,
mutual family or village based reciprocal  giving  arrangements,  etc.  For a recent  survey of these
practices  see Dercon (2000).
The acknowledged  precarious situation of many poor rural residents in developing countries has
led to  calls for the  adoption  of various additional  safety nets  (World Bank,  2001). Apart from
publicly based such safety nets for rural residents,  some proposals have advocated market based
insurance  systems.  For instance,  the recent  initiative  of the  International  Task Force  (ITF)  on
Commodity  Risk  Management,  has  proposed  using  market  based  derivative  instruments  to
provide  price  insurance  for  internationally  traded  commodities  (ITF,  1999),  while  other
proposals  have  suggested  using  market  based  weather  insurance  to  cover  yield  risks  (Skees,
Hazell  and  Miranda,  1999).  Varangis,  Larson  and  Anderson  (2002)  have  suggested  using
combinations  of the  above  instruments  to  manage  agricultural  market  risks  in  developing
countries.
The  various  proposals,  however,  have  not  considered  the  demand  for  such  safety nets,  by the
beneficiaries.  The  issue in the  context of agricultural  income insurance  is the  following.  Under
the structural  conditions,  exposure to risk, and risk mitigations  strategies  agricultural  producers
have  adopted,  how  much  yield  and price  insurance  for  the  commodities  produced  would they
wish  to obtain,  and  how much would they be willing  to pay for  it? These  are crucial  questions
that must be answered if a system of providing rural safety nets and in particular various types of
commodity  insurance  (quantity or price based)  are to be promoted in developing  countries.  The
purpose of this paper is to explore  the issue of the demand for commodity insurance  theoretically
as  well  as  empirically  for  the  case  of price  insurance,  and  in the  context  of a poor  agrarian
economy, with rural  households  significantly dependent on agricultural commodity risks.
A significant  share of the income variations of rural producers  in developing countries  seem to
be  due  to  idiosyncratic  shocks,  namely  shocks  particular  to  a  household  (such  as  sickness)
(Morduch,  1995,  Townsend,  1995,  Carter,  1997).  Such risks  can be insured through  formal  or
informal pooling of a large number of such shocks,  such as through  village reciprocity relations,
that exist in many developing  countries,  or formal private  or public insurance schemes that exist
in many developed  countries.  Covariate shocks, however, namely those that affect all households
in a given community or region,  such as weather  or price shocks,  cannot be insured by pooling
them  within  a  small  region,  and  can  be insured  only if pooled  over  a  much  wider  range  of
potentially  affected  households.  It is the  need to insure  farmers,  against  such covariate  shocks
that  have  induced  the  governments  of most  developed  countries  to  institute  various  price  or2
income  support  schemes,  under the perception  that the  private insurance  industry would not be
able to provide adequate coverage  at reasonable cost.
The  non-existence  of  such  arrangements  in  developing  countries  is  what  induces  rural
households  to  develop  self  insurance,  or  what  has  been  termed  "consumption  smoothing
strategies"  to  deal  with  covariate  shocks.  These  strategies  basically  involve  building
"precautionary  savings",  in the form of liquid or near liquid  assets (cash,  grain stocks, livestock,
jewelry,  etc.) in good  years,  and depleting  them  in years  of adverse  covariate  shocks  (Deaton,
1991).  There  is  conflicting  evidence,  however,  on  whether  such  strategies  are  effective  at
smoothing consumption  (Rosenzweig  and  Binswanger  (1993),  Rosenzweig  and Wolpin,  1993,
Fafchamps,  et.  al,  1998, Dercon,  2000).  The consensus,  nevertheless,  appears  to be that despite
the variety of smoothing  strategies  adopted  by poor households in developing  countries there  is
substantial  residual  consumption  risk  (Jalan  and  Ravallion,  1999).  There  is  also  evidence  that
these  practices  are  costly  at  the  micro  level  in  terms  of current  income  and  consumption
foregone,  as well as the types of investments undertaken  (Fafchamps and Pender,  1997).  Finally
there  is  evidence  that  commodity  price  instability  is  detrimental  to  overall  macroeconomic
growth (Collier and Dehn, 2001).  For all these reasons the additional provisions of safety nets or
insurance mechanisms  in rural areas  is crucial to poverty alleviation,  as well as growth.
Under  the  above  circumstances,  how  is  one  to  assess  the  benefit,  and  hence  the  potential
Willingness  of Producers  to Pay (WTP),  namely their underlying  demand,  for additional  income
insurance,  and  in particular  insurance  against  downward  commodity  price  risks?  The question
cannot  be judged  in abstract,  but only in the  context  of the  already existing  self or community
based  insurance  systems  available  to  households,  and  after  taking into  account  the  degree  to
which  they have  altered their economic  behavior  to take  into  account  such possibilities.  If,  for
instance,  households  are  already using  precautionary  savings  to  smooth out covariate  price  and
quantity variations to income,  they are already paying for such insurance through the opportunity
cost  of any  consumption  that  is  put  into  saving.  Unless  the  provision  of  additional  income
insurance  in  such  circumstances  costs  less,  or  provides  for more  reliable  insurance  at  similar
cost, households may not be willing to pay for it.
There  are  two  consequences  of providing  in  every period  some  type of income  insurance  to  a
household,  including  special  types,  such  as  commodity  price  insurance.  The  first  involves  a
ceteris paribus  increase in overall welfare,  assuming that nothing else in the household  structure
changes.  This will be the  object  of this paper,  and  can be  considered  as the minimum  possible
benefit from the insurance.  The second consequence involves  changes in the overall income and
production  pattern.  These  changes  will  occur  if  the  household  believes  that  the  insurance
provided  is permanent,  namely will be provided  in every period.  Both common sense  as well as
theory  suggest that if a household  is covered  through  adequate  safety nets, then  it may adopt  a
production  and income pattern  that is more risky, in the sense  that it  includes  larger amounts  of
activities  that have  uncertain  returns  (Newberry  and  Stiglitz,  1981,  Fraser,  1988,  Finkelshtain
and  Chalfant,  1991,  Moschini  and  Lapan,  1995,  Gollier,  1995).  Empirical  verification  of these
theoretical  predictions,  however,  is difficult  (for a review  of relevant  studies  and  problems  see
Moschini and Hennessy, 2001).
This paper  outlines  a theory  of the  benefit  from  commodity  insurance,  under  fixed production
structure,  and  a methodology  for  empirical  assessment of this benefit.  The theory  developed  is
applied  to  Ghana,  and  for  the case  of price  insurance  for  cocoa.  Ghana  is  a poor country  (per
capita income  around  400  USD),  with a  large  rural  population  (68  percent  of the  18.9  million3
inhabitants) that depends  substantially on agriculture  (35 percent of GDP). About 42.6 percent of
the total population and 51.6 percent of the rural population live below the poverty  line. Ghana is
heavily dependent  on three commodities (gold,  timber  and  cocoa) for its exports.  In  year 2000
cocoa  accounted  for  20 percent  of export  earnings,  down  from about  40 percent  in  1990  and
more  in the  1980s.  Cocoa  is the  most important  cash  crop  for  farmers  in the  southern  "Rural
Forest" agroecological  zone, and  it accounts  for  13 percent of national  agricultural  GDP.  There
are  about  500  000  cocoa  producing  households  (11  percent  of all  Ghana  households  or  16
percent of all households producing some agricultural output).
Cocoa  is  mostly  exported,  and  a  government  parastatal  marketing  agency  "Cocobod"  has
monopolized  cocoa trade  until recently  when  liberalization  allowed  the participation  of private
marketing  agents.  Domestic  cocoa prices  have been  stable  and under  government  control,  and
the  government  through  Cocobod  has  absorbed most of the  international  price  fluctuations,  in
effect through variations  in its export tax revenue  from exports.  Cocoa export tax revenues have
fluctuated  widely and  have  averaged  between  4 and  15 percent  of total tax  revenues  during the
decade of the  1990s  (for a review of the history  and consequences  of the  various cocoa related
policies  of the  government  of Ghana (GOG)  see Varangis  and Schreiber,  2001).  A more  open
trading  regime,  however,  will  expose  domestic  producers  directly  to  international  price
fluctuations.  Even if,  however,  Cocobod  maintains its price guarantee  function,  it may consider
insuring  its  minimum price  offered  to  farmers  in international  markets,  and charge  farmers  an
insurance  premium  for it (which  could be implicit in the prices offered).  Thus the  estimation of
the WTP  of farmers  for insurance  is relevant to this  case  as well. The availability of organized
international  futures  and  options  markets,  make the  study of the  demand  for commodity  price
insurance  for  cocoa  in  Ghana  particularly  interesting,  as  the  possibility  arises  of providing
insurance  through  commercially available derivative  instruments like options
The  plan of the  paper  is the  following.  In  section  2  a  review  of previous  relevant  studies  is
presented.  Section 3 outlines the theoretical  framework.  Section 4 explains the application of the
theory to an empirical  setting.  Section 5 presents the data and estimations of the various model
parameters  for Ghana.  Section 6 presents the empirical results concerning  WTP, while section 8
compares the WTP with actual market based put option prices. The final section  summarizes the
conclusions  and implications.
2. Previous literature related to commodity  insurance
There  are  three ways that have been utilized  to  assess the WTP of farmers for price  or income
insurance.  The  first  involves  direct  questioning of producers,  and is related to  the literature  on
contingent  valuation (we shall term this the CV method). The second method involves the use of
theory  along  with  the  combination  of  microeconomic  household  information,  and  market
information  to  estimate  indirectly  the  appropriate  premiums  (this  will  be  termed  the  indirect
method).  The third involves inference of the willingness to pay from analysis of the patterns of
production and other behavior of producers  (we shall term this the revealed preference method).
The  CV methods  are based on direct  questioning of agents  (producers, households,  etc.) on how
much they  are willing  to pay for  avoiding  an undesirable  event,  or  for  a  given  amount  of an
insurance  contract.  The  major  problems  with  this  approach  have  largely  to  do  with  the
specification  of  the  "scenario"  or  the  "benchmark"  against  which  the  agent  is  supposed  to
compare  the current  situation,  and  express  a monetary  value  for what it  is worth  to him/her to
move to the new situation, or avoid a bad one. It is not always easy to specify well this scenario,4
especially if it involves  a rather improbable  event,  and this lies at the heart  of most criticisms of
this  approach  (see  e.g.  the papers  in Hausman  (1993)).  However,  in  the  case of well  specified
risks, such as price or yield variations,  it is likely that farm households  are familiar not only with
their normal values, but  also with their variability over time,  and hence the above criticism  may
not be valid.
Another problem with direct  WTP studies involves  the  fact that reported values  are likely to be
influenced  by recent experiences,  For instance  farmers  are more likely  to  express high demand
for  price  insurance  if prices  in  recent  periods  have  been  low.  There  are  also  several  issues
concerning  the  method  of  deriving  the  WTP  from  either  direct  expression  of  values,  or
contingent  rankings  of alternative  choices,  but these  seem  to have  been  largely  resolved.  The
literature  on CV based  methods  has recently been  surveyed by McCarthy  (2002),  who provides
more discussion on both conceptual  as well as estimation issues, and more references.
There  are very few studies relevant to  agricultural insurance,  that  use the  CV approach.  Patrick
(1988)  analyses  producers'  demand  for  a  multiple  peril  crop  insurance  (MPCI)  program  with
indemnities  based  on  actual yields,  and  a rainfall insurance  program  with indemnities based  on
area  rainfall,  and  uses  tobit  procedures  to  analyze  factors  influencing  farmers'  WTP  for  the
alternative  programs.  Vandeveer  and  Loehman  (1994)  applied  both  dichotomous  choice  and
ranking  of activities  in  a  study of farmer  response  to  modifications  in  crop  insurance.  The
ranked responses were used in a ranked logit model to derive WTP.
The indirect methods of estimating WTP  involve first the specification of a model of the random
income  or  other  variable  of direct  relevance  to  the  farmer's  welfare  (e.g.  consumption),  and
expressing  the  WTP  as  the  amount  of money  that would  equate  the  expected  utilities  of the
relevant variable  with and  without the insurance.  This amount of money (the premium)  is  then
estimated  for objectively  estimated values of the risks with and without the insurance,  and  for a
range of relevant utilities,  or relevant parameters (such  as degrees  of risk aversion)  from a given
class of utilities.
There  are  also  very few  studies  attempting  to  estimate  WTP  for  agricultural  insurance  by the
indirect  approach.  Hazell,  Bassoco  and Arcia (1986)  applied a programming  model  to infer the
demand  for crop  yield insurance  by the representative  farmer in Mexico.  Fraser (1992)  uses  an
indirect  method to estimate WTP for crop insurance.  He does this by estimating and  comparing
certainty equivalents,  in the presence and  absence of insurance, of expected utility,  based on the
mean-variance  framework  and  constant  relative  risk aversion.  Bardsley,  Abey  and  Davenport
(1984),  use  a simulation  model  to  estimate the  amount of insurance  at a  given minimum  price
that will be purchased, per unit of insured quantity.
All the  indirect methods  have to  use market data to  infer the various parameters  of the models,
such  as  price  and  yield  variabilities,  as  well  as  estimates  of risk  aversion  parameters.  While
estimates  of market parameters  can be estimated  readily if the appropriate  data is available,  risk
parameters  are  not  easy  to  estimate  (for available  empirical  methodologies  see  Moscardi  and
deJanvry  1977, Binswanger  1980, Antle (1987,89), and Bardsley and Harris  1987). This suggests
that the relevant  measures of the WTP must be estimated using a set of risk aversion parameters
that are considered  as  spanning the  appropriate true values  in the relevant  region.  An additional
restriction  of these  methods  is that they must  assume  some  parametric  form of utility  that  can
subsequently be  simulated.  Nevertheless,  the methods  avoid many of the subjectivity  issues,  as
well as the scenario design problems that plague the CV based approaches.5
The  revealed  preference  (RP)  method  relies  on  the  idea that  the  producers  are  behaving  with
respect to their production  and saving-investment  decisions in a way that is compatible with their
attitudes  toward  risk.  Their  desire  and  WTP  for  insurance  is  expressed  implicitly  in  these
decisions.  If  a  model  can  be  constructed  that  takes  all  these  decisions  into  account,  then
observable  behavioral  patterns  can  be  deduced,  from  which  risk  attitudes  as  well  as  WTP
measures  can be  estimated.  The problem,  of course,  if to specify  a  general  enough model that
allows for the derivation of risk attitudes  and WTP measures.
An  early  paper  by Binswanger  and  Sillers  (1983)  utilized  this  methodology  to  estimate  the
implied  risk attitude  parameters  of farmers,  but did not consider explicitly  insurance.  The  first
paper  using  a methodology  of this  type to  estimate  risk premiums  for insurance  is  the  one  by
Gautam,  Hazell and Alderman (1994).  In that paper the farm household's  behavior is assumed  to
be described by the  maximization of the expected value of an intertemporal  utility function.  The
production,  saving,  labor  allocation,  diversification,  borrowing,  and  insurance  decisions  are
assumed  to  be  endogenous.  The  equilibrium  conditions  of  the  optimization  problem  are
manipulated to infer the production and diversification decisions of the household as fumctions of
both  standard  variables  as  well  as  a  variable  that  measures  the  relative  preference  of  the
household for risky versus non-risky income.
Under  the  assumption that the household  is already well diversified  and insured,  implying that
there is no unmet need for further insurance,  the value of this parameter  should take  a value that
can be inferred  from non-experimental  data.  The  authors  use panel data to  estimate the value of
this parameter  implied  by  the  actual  behavior  of farmers,  and  deduce  that there  seems  to  be
considerable  latent demand  for crop  insurance,  and furthermore,  that the implied WTP is in the
neighborhood  of  13-17  percent  of  the  indemnity  value.  These  numbers  (supplemented  by
estimated  transactions  cost)  suggested  in  that  case,  that  the  WTP  of  farmers  for  drought
insurance  is above  the cost of actuarially  fair drought insurance,  and hence  that the provision  of
such insurance  would be commercially viable.
The strength  of this methodology  lies  in the  fact  that  it can  estimate  the  "latent  demand"  for
drought  insurance, namely the additional  and as yet unmet demand  for insurance,  given that the
households  already have  some self insurance  mechanism.  The underlying  assumption  is that the
way the  households  have  adjusted  to the  recurring  weather  risks is by  diversifying,  as  well  as
adopting  different  production  patterns  than  what  would  be  dictated  through  simple  expected
income  calculations.  As  such,  the  empirical  estimates  involve  the  long  run  or  steady  state
production pattern of the farm household, given the household's perceptions of drought risks.
This approach  seems suitable for the issue of assessing how farm households who are  exposed to
price  risk adjust their long tern  production  structures (for instance through diversification),  and
what  implicit risk  attitudes  dictate  the  observed  production  patterns.  The method  may  also  be
suitable for assessing the WTP for price insurance, but, the data requirements  are  quite heavy,  as
they invariably involve panel survey data.
The same  approach  is essentially  followed by Sakurai  and Reardon  (1997) who utilized  panel
data for Burkina Faso.  The  additional  feature  of this study  is that  the  researchers  regress their
estimates  of farm  level  demands  for  drought  insurance  on a  set  of variables,  so  as  to identify
variables  that  increase  or decrease  such  demand.  They  find,  as  expected,  that  the  demand  for
drought  insurance  depends  on the perceived probabilities  of droughts,  and  is higher for regions
with higher  such probabilities.  They  also  find that variables  such  as the  size of cultivated  area,6
and  the  age  of household  significantly  affect  positively  the  demand  for  insurance,  while  the
amount  of off-farm  income,  the  availability  of public  aid  and  private  gifts,  and  the  size  of
household  significantly  affect  negatively  the  demand  for  insurance.  These  are  reasonable  and
expected findings.
There are finally few studies who utilize panel data to infer simultaneously the risk attitudes and
consumption  smoothing  parameters  of  rural  households.  All  of  these  studies  use  the  RP
methodology  to  assess  risk  attitudes  and  consumption  smoothing  as  well  as  diversifications
patterns  and savings  parameters  for  rural households,  using  panel data,  but  do not  consider the
demand for  insurance.  Examples  of such studies  are the ones by Kurosaki  (1998), Kurosaki  and
Fafchamps (2002), Fafcharnps, Udry and Czukas (1998),  and Dercon (1996,  1998).
3. A model for the demand for commodity  price insurance
Commodity price insurance  for an agricultural  producer  is like a put option, or a minimum price
guarantee.  In  other  words  it  guarantees  for  the  amount  of contracts  purchased  or  quantity
covered,  and over a period stated in the contract,  a minimum  price (the strike price of the option
like contract),  but allows the producer  to obtain a higher price.  This  similarity is the basic reason
that  renders  price  insurance  schemes  based  on  derivative  instruments  traded  in  organized
markets  possible  (Duncan,  1997,  Sarris,  1997,  2000,  2002,  Varangis,  Larson  and  Anderson,
2002).  Commodity yield insurance  is similar to price insurance  except that the  role of price and
quantity  are  reversed.  In other  words  rather  than  guaranteeing  a  minimum  price  for  a  given
quantity,  yield  insurance  guarantees  to farmers  a  given price  for  a minimum  insured  quantity.
Thus the put-like  option  is on quantity produced  rather than price.  In  the  sequel the  discussion
will  refer to  price  insurance,  with  the  understanding  that all  theoretical  analysis  can  be  easily
transposed to the yield insurance problem.
There  are  several  points  of clarification  worth  mentioning  in the  context  of commodity  price
insurance.  First,  the price insurance may not  affect all of the production of a producer,  but only
the  amount  of production  covered,  and  hence  it  is  not  strictly  similar  to  a  minimum  price
guarantee  scheme  for whatever output is produced, of the type that have been adopted by many
governments.  Nevertheless,  an agricultural  producer  is probably  more  interested  in a minimum
price guarantee for whatever amount of product he/she2 decides to sell.
The  second  issue concerns  the type of price and market  that is relevant  for a producer,  and  the
ones that must be considered in estimating WTP for price insurance.  It  is clear that a producer is
mainly interested  in the price he receives  for his commodity  locally.  If this price  happens  to be
the  same  or  partially  correlated  with  some  international  price  or  price  in  some  organized
exchange,  then  such price  offers  good  signals  to the  producer.  However,  as  far  as  his WTP  is
concerned,  price information must relate to local prices.
Third,  the WTP for commodity price insurance  depends at what point in the production  cycle the
producer  is  faced  with  the  possibility  to  buy  insurance.  For  instance,  the  insurance  can  be
provided  at  a  point  in  the  year,  after  all  production  inputs  are  committed,  and  the  only
uncertainties  facing  the  producer  are  environment  related  and  price  related.  Alternatively,  the
insurance  can be offered before the annual production  decision  is made. The WTP under each of
these  alternatives  should  be  different,  and  in  fact  is  expected  to  be  larger  on  average  in  the
2  In the sequel the male gender is used to refer to a producer, without implying any prejudice concerning the type of
agricultural household head.7
second  situation above,  as in that case the producer has larger flexibility to adjust, and hence can
achieve larger expected utility with the insurance.
Fourth,  it makes a difference  whether  insurance,  under  either of the  two types indicated  above
(before  or  after  annual  production  decisions)  is  temporary,  namely  a one  shot  affair,  or is
offered  every year.  In the former case,  the producer is not expected to alter long term behavior,
while in the latter case he is.
The theory outlined  below pertains  to  the case of insurance  offered  within  one crop  year,  and
after the major short term production  decisions,  such as land and fertilizer allocations,  have been
made. It thus assumes that the long term diversification pattern of the producer stays unaffected.
In  this  sense,  the  estimated  benefit,  and WTP  can  be  considered  as  the  minimum  demand  for
price insurance.  Any changes  in production structure will provide an additional benefit,  but will
not be considered here.
Assume that for a farm household time is measured in crop years, indexed by an integer T. Each
crop  year  is  divided  into  two,  not  necessarily  equal,  periods  1 and  2,  indexed by j.  The  first
period  within  each  crop  year  is  meant  to  represent  the  period  after planting,  but before  the
resolution of production and price uncertainty,  while the second period is meant to represent the
resolution of production and price uncertainty, and the realization of annual crop income.  In the
first period the household income consists of sources other than agriculture,  while all agricultural
income  is  assumed  to be realized  in the  second period (in  addition to  other possible  sources  of
income).  Time is indexed by an integer variable  t=2T+j, where j=1  or 2. Hence, odd values of t
denote the first part of any crop year, while even values the second part.
Denote the vector of consumed  goods (it may include leisure) of the farm household in period t
by Ct,  the vector of quantities of assets in the beginning of period t by At,  the vector of decision
variables  (such  as  inputs,  land  allocation,  amount  of insurance  instruments  to buy,  savings  and
investment decisions, etc.) that are determined in period t by xt  , the information available to the
decision  maker  at  the  beginning  of period  t by  It (such  as  values  of all realized  economic
variables as well as  states of nature in previous  years),  and  the state of nature that is revealed  in
the beginning  of period t by  St  (this may include uncertainty  about income affecting variables
such as weather, prices,  sickness,  etc.). Also denote by PAt  , Pct and  pt , the vectors of prices of
assets, consumption goods, and income eaming activities  (including labor) respectively at time t.
Denote by U(C,) the instantaneous household utility in period t. The household will be postulated
to  maximize the ex-ante expected  value of the discounted sum of instantaneous utilities, over n
crop years.
W = E{[  E  U(CO)]/I1}  (1)
where o denotes  an appropriate  discount factor.  The expectation  in (1)  is taken over  all states of
nature  St  (t=1,2,,.,2n),  based  on  information  at  the  beginning  of the  relevant  horizon  for the
household.  The maximization will be assumed to be over all sets of decision vectors xt
The restrictions relating the various variables are the folfowing.
PAeA1+I  = PAtA, + p,yj (A,  X,  S,) - pCC, =-  R, - pc C  (2)
x,  E=  X,  (3)8
The equation  in  (2)  defines  the value of end of period assets  at period  t prices.  The variable  Rt
denotes  the  value of resources  available  to the  household  at  the beginning of period  t, namely
previous period assets  valued at current  period prices, plus current  income  from these assets.  Xt
is an appropriate constraint set for the decision  variables, and yj (.)  denotes the vector of quantity
of netput  activities (positive if outputs,  negative if inputs) affecting the income of the household
in period  t3. The  subscript j  in the income  function  denotes  the possibility  that income  sources
may be  different  in the  two  periods  of each  crop  year.  However,  note  that the  nature  of the
income function y is time invariant.  In other words  it is assumed that during the planning horizon
of the household,  the nature of the income generating  activities,  stays  unchanged.  This implies,
for instance,  that unknown  future  technological  improvements  are not taken  into account  in the
household's  planning  problem.  Notice  that  the  budget  constraint  (2)  takes  into  account
appreciation  of assets,  through  the  revaluation  of assets  carried  over from  last  period  (At  )  at
current  period  asset  prices.  Notice  that  no  restriction  is  placed  on  the  sign  of  assets.  Hence
negative assets (namely liabilities  such as borrowing)  are  allowed in this general  formulation.  If
the household  is liquidity constrained, then the restriction that some or all  assets should be non-
negative must be imposed (Deaton,  1991).
The  nature  of the  solution  to  such  a  problem  is  theoretically  well  known,  and  involves  the
application  of Kuhn-Tucker  first order  conditions (if there  are non-negativity constraints)  to the
standard  Bellman equation  (for illustrations  see Deaton,  1992a,  Zeldes,  1989).  If the utility and
income  generating  functions  are  time invariant, as has been assumed  here,  and if the  stochastic
processes  determining  prices  as well  as  the other uncertainties  affecting  household  incomes  are
stationary,  the general  solution for the consumption  in each period is a time invariant function of
the "state variables"  in period t, namely variables  that summarize the information available  to the
household in the beginning of period t. Such information generally  include the volumes of assets
at the start of period t, the state of nature in period t (such as uncertain  types  of income), and the
prices  of the  various  assets  and  products  that  enter production  and  consumption.  Under  some
restrictive  assumptions  such as equality of all prices,  and simple linear income  generating rules,
the  solution  can  be  obtained  numerically  (e.g.  Deaton,  1991).  In  general  the  solution  is  not
analytically tractable,  and can be written as follows.
C,  = f  (I,) = f  (A,,  yj  (A,, S,), P, I  PA, I  Pc)  (4)
If an equation like (4) is the solution to the overall optimization problem (1)-(3),  then the utility
function in (1)  can be rewritten as follows.
W =  EI  5T [U(C2 +I)  +5E(C 2T+2 I2T+I)iIO  i  =  }  E{Z5ITV(C 2T+I,  I2T+1)1V0}  (5)
In  (5)  51  = ,2,  the consumption within the various  parentheses  and brackets has a form  like (4),
and  the  function  V just defines  the  quantity  inside  the bracket  in  the  left  had side of (4).  The
expectation  inside the brackets  are taken conditional  on information  available  in the first period
3 The  returns  to  any  financial  assets,  such  as  interest  on  deposits  or  loans,  are  included  in  the  income  terms.
Similarlv the depreciation of physical  assets can also be considered as included in y in this general notation.9
of a given crop  year  T,  while the unconditional  expectations  outside the brackets  are taken with
information available in the beginning of the planning horizon, namely year 04.
Consider now the provision of an insurance  contract  to the  farmer in the first period of the crop
year, whose  outcome depends  on events  of the  second period.  The contract  considered  is in the
form of an option to sell all or a portion of a produced crop at a minimum "strike" price.  Denote
the  amount  of the  crop  that  is  insured  as  q  (can  be  fixed  or  variable),  and  the  return  to  the
insurance  contract  per  unit of the  insured  crop  as  r.  The  insurance  contract  is  similar  to  the
minimum price  guarantee schemes  that have been  popular in developed  countries  (such as  the
loan rate system for cereals in the US), and hence the theory applies to these settings as well.
If we  assume  that  the  nature  of the  function  f in  (4)  is not  affected  by  the  provision  of this
contract,  then  we  can define the benefit  of this contract  as  the amount that must be subtracted
from income of the first period  in the crop year, so that the two-period utility with the contract is
equal to the utility without it. Analytically we define the benefit in year T to be the solution B to
the following implicit equation.
U(C2T+I (Y,  - B)) + SE[U(C2T+2(Y2 + rq))jI 2T+l ]  =  U(C 2 T+. (YO))  + 5E[U(C 2T+2 (Y2 ))JI2T+1|  (6)
The key assumption that allows  the  definition  in (6)  is that the  nature of the income generating
function  yj (.)  as  well  as  the  consumption  function  (4)  are  not  altered  by  the  provision  of
insurance.  This,  of course,  is  not  strictly correct,  as  the  household  may  adjust  its  long  tern
exposure to risk as is implied by theory, but as the nature of the changes in the income functions
as well as the consumption function under insurance are quite intractable,  the assumption can be
considered  as a first approximation,  and one that can facilitate  the estimation  of the  "minimum
value" of WTP, for such insurance contracts.
To  utilize  (6)  for  empirical  analysis  we  first  assume  that  total  household  consumption  is
composed  of  one  aggregate  commodity.  This  is  done  for  convenience,  so  as  to  neglect
commodity  composition  consumption  effects.  Then  we  approximate  (4)  by  the  following
aggregate consumption function.
C  C- +A(R  )=  C;  +  p(R, - R  (7)
Pct
where Rt has been  defined in (2), and where  we have normalized  all nominal values by the price
of aggregate  consumption  (namely a  suitable  consumer  price  index).  The  formulation  in (7)  is
the one that has been utilized  as an  approximation  to the optimal  rule (4)  in the  literature  of the
general  lifetime  optimization problem  under  uncertainty  as  well as  under  liquidity constraints
(there  is  a  large  literature  on  consumption  under  uncertainty  and  liquidity  constraints,  and
consumption  smoothing.  For useful  surveys  see Deaton,  1992b,  Browning  and  Lusardi,  1996,
and Morduch,  1995).
In  (7)  the  value of "trend"  real  consumption  C  is  assumed  not  to  depend  on  current  period
random  variables,  albeit  it may  include time  varying  components  due  to  seasonal  or lifetime
effects.  The  current  (real)  value  of resources  Rt  includes  the  current  real  income  of  the
household,  as  well  as  the  current  valuation  (deflated  by  the  consumer  price  index)  of  the
4 If the two periods within the crop year  are different in duration,  the discount rate within the bracket in the left hand
side of (5)  will be different than  the discount rate outside  the same bracket.10
household  assets.  As  such  it  includes  both  covariate  risks,  such  as  price  variations,  as well  as
idiosyncratic  risks.  The  starred  value  of R  is  the  trend  or  expected  value  of these resources
(income and assets).  The parameter  ,B  denotes the amount of smoothing that the household does
in each  period,  and  is  a  function of household  characteristics.  If P is  equal  to  0,  then  there  is
perfect  smoothing,  and current  consumption  is independent  of current  income,  or the  value  of
current assets.  If 1  is equal  to  1, there  is  no  smoothing  at all,  and current consumption  moves
exactly as current resources.  Notice that perfect smoothing may involve negative values of assets
in  some  periods  (namely  debts).  If  this  is  impossible  due  to  liquidity  constraints,  then
consumption smoothing will not be perfect and the relevant value for P will be larger than zero.
Denote by z the term that include the total (real) return to the insurance contract.
z  = rq  (8)
where by r we now denote the return  to the insurance  contact, deflated by the CPI in the relevant
period.  We can then write the consumption with the insurance in each of the two periods of crop
year T as  follows  (the year  specific  variable T is suppressed  for ease of notation, and because  it
does not affect the subsequent analysis which depends  only on the seasonal  variables).
C, = C, + 9(Rj - B - R 1 ) = C,* +  (R, - R>) -iB  -C>  + PAR, -,B=  C, -fiB  (9)
c 2 =C;  +/(R 2 +z-R;)=C; +/(R2  -R;)+/z  C; +AR2  +fz=C2  +/Z  (10)
In  (9)  and  (10)  the  consumption  variables  with  hats  denote  consumption  with  the  insurance
contract, while the ones without hats denote consumption without insurance.
We  can  now  expand  the  utilities  in both  the  left  and  right  hand  sides  of (6)  about  C;  using
Taylor's  theorem.  Neglecting  the  Taylor  expansion  terms  higher  than  second  order,  and
canceling similar terms from the left and right hand sides of (6), results in the following equation
(primes denote differentiation).
0 = -U'(C  )B+ I 8U(Cl)  (B2 - 2B  AR,) +  U'(C)E(z)  + 2lU(c2)* E(Z2) + 2E(zAR 2
(2  )
In (11)  E(.)  denotes conditional  expectation,  given information  in period  I of the  crop year.  To
proceed, assume that the trend real consumption  is the same in each of the two sub-periods of the
crop  year.  Denote  this  common  value  (which  may  be  different  in  each  crop  year)  by  C*.
Furthermore,  define the following normalized  variables.
r  - r  (12)
e
Pi2
_  B  (13)
C(
qrp 2 q  (14)
C*z  _=r q  =C  (15)
C'
rR.
Rjr  - 0(j=1,2)  (16)
c.
R;r  R;  (j=1,2)  (17)
SC
P  C' U'  (18)
In (12) the price in the denominator  is the expected or normal price of the insured commodity in
period  2. In (13)-(17)  all variables  are defined as shares of trend real expenditures,  and (18) just
defines the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
With these definitions,  equation  (11)  can be rewritten  as a quadratic equation  in the normalized
benefit, as follows.
1  (Br)
2 + (Br)(1 _ARr  )+6  E(Zr') ++E(Z  )  +2E( rARr)  0  (19)
2  4- +I{2  Z  2=  0  (19
where 0 is the product of the coefficient of relative risk aversion  and the consumption smoothing
parameter.
° = P/i  (20)
Solving the  quadratic equation  (19)  and using the  approximation  (1 + 6)1/2  .1  +  - £we  find the
following expression for the WTP  for commodity insurance.
B  r =  E(zr)+ I 0[(,ARr)2  _-5{E(Zr)2 +2E(ZrARr)}]  (21)
From (21) it can be readily seen that if the consumption smoothing parameter P is equal to zero,
or if risk aversion  is zero,  then the value of B is equal to the  (discounted)  expected value of the
return to the (normalized)  insurance  contract, namely
Bo  = SE(Zr) = SE(r rq)  (22)
This value then can be taken as the benchmark  value, or the value of the benefit from provision
of the insurance  under  risk neutrality  and/or  perfect  consumption  smoothing.  In  fact  it  is the
actuarially  fair  premium  for  the  insurance,  and  as  such  it  has  appeared  in  analyses  of crop
insurance  in developed  countries  (Turvey,  1992,  Fraser,  1992).  The contribution  of the  theory
expounded here  can be considered  as the  inclusion  of terms  additional  to those  in (22), that
reflect  the joint risk aversion  and consumption  smoothing behavior of the farm household.  The
formula  in (22) bears some  similarity to the formula derived for the benefit of a consumer from
price or income stabilization in chapter 9 of Newberry and Stiglitz (1981).
Notice  that  the  benefit  defined  in  equation  (21)  includes  the  (square  of)  realization  of the
deviation of real normalized  resources  in period  1 from their trend values.  This means that the12
benefit of the  one period  ahead  insurance,  is state  contingent, namely depends  on the household
resources realized  in  the  same period.  Hence,  if,  for  instance,  survey techniques  are  utilized  to
ask producers  about  their WTP for a specific  insurance  contract,  as is  done in CV studies,  then
the answers will depend on current realizations  of uncertain income related variables,  and cannot
be  considered  as representative  of WTP  over a longer period.  This is a limitation of CV studies
that was  pointed  out  earlier.  The  same  holds  about  the  conditional  expectations  in  the  terms
multiplying 0, as they are also conditioned by realizations of period 1.
Expression (22) leads to several conclusions that are compatible with intuition.  First, the larger  is
the  degree  of risk aversion  (larger  value  of p),  and  the  smaller  is  the  degree  of consumption
smoothing  (larger  values  of P),  the  larger is the  benefit  of insurance.  Second,  the  larger  is  the
degree of (unpredictable)  deviation of current  resources  from normal  (positive  or negative),  the
larger is the WTP  for insurance.  Third,  the larger is the variance  of the return of the  insurance
contract,  the  lower the  WTP  for  it.  Finally  the  WTP  for  an insurance  contract  is larger  with  a
more  negative  correlation  between  the  return  to  insurance  and  the  second  period  resource
uncertainty.
To  estimate  the  average  benefit  we  take  the  expectation  of the  expression  in  (21)  over  all
realizations  of the first period variables.
B'  =E{E(zr yi)+-0[(ARir)2-di{E(zj|yi)2 +2E(z'AR2'yi)},  (23)
where the vector y, denotes  all the random  variables that are known in period  1, and conditioned
on which the expectations  of period 2 are taken.  If, of course, the conditional  expectations  in (23)
do not depend  on the vector yi,  then the unconditional  and conditional  expectations  will be the
same.  Equation (23) will form the basis of the empirical  estimates of the demand for commodity
price insurance.
4. Empirical implementation  of the model
According  to  (23)  and  under  the  assumption  that  the  expected  values  of the  deviations  of
household  resources  from their trend values in each period are zero,  there are four variables  that
need  to  be  specified  empirically,  apart  from  the parameters  ,B  and  p,  in  order  to  estimate  the
benefit of insurance.  These are the following.
E(rr'q), Var(rrq'), Cov(r'q ,RR')  and  Var(ARr)  (24)
The  first  three  of  these  expressions  are  the  expectations  with  respect  to  the  conditioning
variables,  of  the  one  period  ahead  conditional  expectations.  If,  of  course,  the  conditional
expectations  do  not  depend  on  any  first  period  variables,  then  the  unconditional  and  the
conditional expectations  are the same. The last term is an unconditional variance.
To proceed,  the reasonable  assumption is made that the return to the price  insurance  contract is
independent  from the quantity insured. Hence.
E(rr  qr)= E(r  r)E(q')  (25)
Var(rrqr) = Var(r')Var(q')  + [E(rr  )]  Var(qr  ) + [E(qr)]2  Var(rr)  (26)13
Thus  to  estimate  these  variables  all  we  need  are  the  expected  values  and  variances  of the
insurance  contract return,  and the insured quantity. If the latter is fixed,  as would be the case for
a put option  for a specific quantity, then (26) is further simplified by the omission of the quantity
variance terms. If the quantity is not fixed, as would be the case with a price floor for whatever
quantity is produced,  then the  variance of the (normalized)  insured production  can be obtained
by the residuals of time series regressions on local yield data.
Consider  the  return  to  a  unit  of  the  put-option  like  contract.  Suppose  that  the  underlying
probability  distribution  for the price of the  commodity  in the  next period  is normal,  and has a
conditional  mean  equal  to  pe  and  a conditional  variance  equal  to  a.2.  Assume that  the option
like contract  has a  strike  price  equal to  ps  . This means  that if the  eventual  market price p  is
below ps,  namely if ps -p  >0, the payoff is equal  to ps -p  , while if the  market price is below or
equal  to ps , namely if ps -p < or =0 the payoff is zero. This implies that the distribution of r will
be  a  censored  one  that  derives  from  censoring  above  the  point  zero  the  distribution  of the
variable  y=ps -p which  is similar to the one for the price,  but with mean equal  to  p  =  ps - pe
and variance  equal to  U
2. The distribution of the  normalized variable  r'  will also be truncated
(above zero) normal but relative to a distribution similar to y above, but with normalized (by  pe)
mean and variance.
The expressions  for the  mean and the variance  of a censored normal distribution  can be found,
for instance, in Greene  (2000, p. 907), and  are not repeated  here for economy of exposition.  The
mean  and the variance of the return to the insurance contract will  then depend on the mean and
variance of the underlying conditional  price distribution, namely the values of pe  and  at2*
To analyze the third term in (24) consider  the normalized resource deviation variable for period
2,  AR'.  The terms that will  contribute to  the covariance  with the insurance  contract return  are
those that will be correlated  with the quantity produced of the insured crop  and its price. Among
the several  income sources of the household, the  ones that are likely to be  so correlated  are the
components  of household  income  that  derive from  agriculture.  Hence  we consider  only  these
terms.  With  this  assumption  we can  write the  second  period  normalized  resource  deviation  as
follows.
ARr  =Xsi(Ap[Ay[  +Apr  +Ay)  (27)
Where  i denotes  the  i'th  agricultural  product  produced  by  the  household,  si  is  the  share  of
household  income  derived  from  the  i'th  product,  and  the  other  terms  denote  the  normalized
deviations of prices and quantities from their expected values.
Denote the  expected  value of the  insured production of the  crop by  qre  . Then  given  (27),  the
covariance term in (24) can be written as follows
Cov(r qr,R)  = E  (rrq' - E(rr)q e)(Es,(Ap[Ay[  + Ap  +Ay[)]=
E[[(rr-  E(rr(qr  L  re)  + (rr)(q  .. re)  qre(r  +  p[ +  (28)
E0[(r - E(r' )(q'- q  ") + E(r')(q'-  qr  ) + qr  (r'  -E(r')E  (pry+  p+  X  )14
This  is a complicated  expression.  To  simplify,  it  will be  assumed  that  the price  of the  insured
crop  is  independent  of the  domestic  prices  of all  other  agricultural  products,  as  well  as  the
quantities  produced.  These  assumptions  are justified  if the  insured  crop  is  an  internationally
traded  one,  and  the  insurance  contract  is  priced  in  an  organized  international  commodity
exchange. This will be the case for any market based commodity price insurance  scheme,  such as
the ones proposed by the ITF. Assume furthermore that the insurance contract covers a share y of
the  produced  crop.  If y=l,  then  all production  is insured,  irrespective  of outcome.  Under  the
above assumptions  (28)  can be written as follows.
Cov(r qT ,AR2)=
s,E(r  r  s,  ci  K  Va  Jr(y  ' )Var(yr'  ) +~yS2E[(r'  - E(rr  ))APr  rJar(yr  ) +  S  E  r  - E(r  4),r]  (
In (29) the  subscript c denotes  the cash crop  that is insured (in this application it will be  cocoa)
and  1ci denotes the correlation coefficient between the production of the insured crop and the i'th
other crop produced  by the household.  The only term that is nontrivial to compute in (29) is the
covariance  between the  return  to  the  insurance  contract  and the  price of the insured  crop.  An
expression  for this  expectation  is derived  in  the  appendix.  If the  contract  covers  only  a  fixed
portion of the crop, namely if q is fixed  and not a function of the actual random production,  then
the only term that remains in (29)  is the  last one.
Consider  now  the  final  term  in  (24),  namely  the  unconditional  variance  of the  first  period
deviation of normalized real  resources  from  trend.  Recall  that this period within the year is the
period  at or right after planting,  or making production plans that will be realized in period 2. The
assumption is that there is no agricultural production during this period. Given, however, the rule
for consumption  in (7),  the dynamic  equation  for resources  available  in (2)  can be written  as a
first order recursive  equation in the volume of assets.  Under the simplifying  assumptions that the
same value  of the  consumption  smoothing  parameter  X  applies  to both periods within  the crop
year, that in the long term the value of total consumption is equal to the value of total resources,
and  that  the  real  prices  of produced  products  and  assets  are  equal,  it can  be shown  that  the
unconditional  variance of first period assets can be written as follows5.
5  This can be shown by writing, under the simplifying assumptions mentioned  in the text, the resource restriction
equation (2) and the consumption smoothing equation (7)  as follows.
At+,  = Al  + y, - C,  - R,  - C,  and  C, = C; + 8(R, - R)
These  imply a recursion equation for assets as follows
A+,+  Q  (-,l3)(A,  - A:  + y, - y;  ,  (C; - R; )
If it is assumed that the household starts with a given amount of resources Ao , that the trend value  of consumption  is
equal  to  the  expected  value  of income  in  the  same  period,  and  that  the  only  income  uncertainty  involves  the
agricultural  income of the second period within the crop year, then it can be  easily shown, if there are no inequality
constraints,  that the  expected value of assets  in every period is equal  to Ao  and that the variance of assets follows the
recursion equation
Var(At+, ) = (1-  /3)2 Var(A, ) + (1 - 8)2 Var(y2 )
Since  the  variance  of the  resources  in period t is just the  sum of the  variance  of the assets  in  period t, plus  the
variance  of period t uncertain income,  then, if the income process is stationary,  the equation (30)  in the text follows.15
VarA  Ir)  Var(y2)  (30)
1- (1-fl)2
In (30)  the variance  term  in the  numerator  is the unconditional  variance  of second period (and
hence  for the crop  year)  agricultural  income.  If there  is no smoothing  and hence ,=1,  then the
variance  of resources  is  equal  to  the  variance  of income,  as  there  is  no  accumulation  and
decumulation  of assets.  If,  on the  other hand,  there  is perfect  smoothing,  namely  3=0,  then the
unconditional  variance  of first  period  resources  will  be  infinite,  as  assets  must  vary by  large
amounts to ensure the complete smoothing of income.  In fact it can be easily shown in this case
that, as the dynamic asset equation  is a random  walk, the variance of the resources  in period t is
just the  sum of the variance  of income  realizations  of every period,  and hence  grows without
bound as  t increases.  For any non-zero  value  of the  consumption  smoothing  parameter  f,  the
unconditional  variance  of first  period resources  will be  larger than  the  variance  of agricultural
income.
The variance of agricultural income in turn can be written as follows:
Var[y2 ]  =  VarF X  si (ApiAyi  + Api + AY)1  =
Li-I  (31)
~  ~sis  AE[(ApiAYi  +Api  +Ay,)(ApjAyj  +Apj +Ayj)]
ij
If we  assume  normality  of the  various  price  and  quantity  terms,  the  only  terms  that  will
contribute to the variance in (31) are  those that include  even number of terms  in the products of
the price and quantity terms. Hence  (31) can be rewritten as follows.
Var(Rir) =  siS  E[pi AiAYi  + ApiApj  + ApiAyj  + ApjAyi  + Ay1Ayj]  (32)
i  j
We postulate models of domestic price  formation that assume partial  international  tradability  of
the various products,  as follows.
1ogp,',  = ai +  ,  logp,  + q. logyr  (33)
In the above equation the domestic price is made a function of the world price and  the domestic
production.  Parameter  gi denotes  the elasticity of transmission of world  price to domestic  price,
and  is  a measure  of tradability.  An  elasticity  equal to  1 implies  that  the domestic  price of the
product  is  determined  basically  in  the  international  market.  In  an  actual  econometric
specification  appropriate  lags  should be  entered  to  account  for  stock  adjustment  effects.  The
parameter  i1  denotes the reduced form elasticity of domestic price to domestic production.  It will
depend on the domestic supply and demand price elasticities for the i'th product.
Denote by as  the coefficient of variation  of yield of the i'th crop produced by the household, by
v,7  the  coefficient  of variation  of the  world  price  of the i'th product,  by  pRj  the correlation
coefficient of world prices of the i'th and j'th products (if they are tradable), by  vi the coefficient
of variation  of the  domestic  price  of the  i'th  product,  and  by  'yij the  correlation  coefficient
between the domestic price of the i'th and j'th products.16
Given (33) the various terms in (32) can be evaluated  as follows
E(ApiApjAyiAyj)  = q1qj (I + 2K,'  )a72a,  +  iLj;pWv,W v,  K  a  a  + vijvJvK  aj  c,j  (34)
E(Ap4Apj)  = 77q,ibK07iji  +  j;j  pjjv,wv7. +  ±jvivv  (35)
E(ApjAyj)  =  q 1 Kijaico  (36)
E(AyiAyj)  =  iuj(37)
The variances and correlations  in the above equations  are unconditional  ones. This implies that if
one, for instance, estimates  a stationary time series model of the price of commodity j of the AR
form
aj(L)pj, = gj,  (38)
where  aj  (L) denotes  a  polynomial  of the  lag  operator  L,  and  Ej,  is  an  iid  error  term  with
variance  s  x  and  covariance  with  the  price  of product  i  equal  to  s,,  then  the  unconditional
variance of the price, as well as the covariances between prices,  can be estimated with the help of
the Yule-Walker equations for stationary time series (Greene,  2000, p. 756).
5. Specification  of the model  and data for Ghana cocoa producers
It is clear from the above theory that the benefit from commodity price insurance by a household
depends  both  on  exogenous  sources  of  covariate  uncertainty,  such  as  the  price  and  yield
variations  of various products,  as well as the allocation of income sources of a household among
different  activities  subject  to  these  uncertainties.  Thus  the  empirical  implementation  of  the
methodology  involves  specifying  the  structure  of  income  of  various  types  of  households
producing  the commodity  under investigation,  as well  as analysis  of the stochastic  nature of the
uncertainties  facing these households.
To implement  the model  for Ghana,  the Ghana  Living Standards  Survey (GLSS)  carried out by
the  Ghana  Statistical  Service  in  collaboration  with  the  World  Bank  was  used  to  specify  the
various  types  of cocoa  producing  households.  These  large  surveys  are  representative  of the
whole  country,  and  there  have been two  such surveys  in Ghana,  one in  1991/92  and  another  in
1998/99.  For  the present  analysis  the  1998/99  GLSS  was  utilized.  Furthermore,  official  time
series  annual  data  on  yields  of the  major  agricultural  products  were  obtained  from  FAO.
Domestic  monthly national  wholesale  prices  for the  major products  of interest  to the  study  are
compiled by the Ministry of Agriculture  in Ghana,  and were obtained with the help of the World
Bank office  in  Accra.  These are  market  prices and  hence  are not  expected  to be influenced  by
government  pricing  policies  which  were  prevalent  for  a  considerable  part  of the  1970s  and
1980s.  World monthly prices of cocoa,  as well as several other products were obtained from the
Economic  Policy and Development  Prospects group of the World Bank,  and represent  the major
indicator market for each product.
The cocoa  producing  households  in Ghana  were  first divided  according  to  their residence.  The
major  region  of cocoa production  in Ghana  is  the  rural  forest  region in  the  south.  However,  a
substantial  number of cocoa  producing households  live in other rural areas near the rural forest
regions,  as well as in urban  areas. Thus three major regions were specified  for the classification,
namely  rural  forest,  other rural  areas,  and all  urban  areas.  According to  the  GLSS  in  1998/99,17
and  the projections  to the  national  total  based  on the  sampling  methodology  used,  there  were
501.8  thousand households  that had  some  income  from cocoa.  Of these,  411.5  thousand or  82
percent  lived in the rural  forest region,  50.3 thousand  or 10 percent lived in other rural areas, and
39.9  thousand  or  8 percent  lived  in  urban  areas.  These  households  were  classified  further
according to their share of income deriving from cocoa (three groups were distinguished, namely
those with  cocoa  income  share  less  than  20 percent,  between  20  and  40  percent  and  over 40
percent).  Each one of these groups was further subdivided according to the share of income from
all agricultural  activities  (those with such  share smaller  and larger than  60 percent),  and  finally
each group thus defined was further subdivided among those that are poor and those that are not.
The  results of these  classifications  and  the  relevant  shares  of income  from  all the  major  and
relevant income sources as well as cocoa are exhibited in tables  1-3.  It can be seen that the shares
of income deriving from cocoa vary considerably  among producers, ranging from 5.8  to over 70
percent.  However,  it  can also  be  seen that there  are  large  disparities  between reported  income
and expenditure,  with the latter almost invariably  considerably larger than the  former. This is a
well  known  problem of all  household  income  and budget  surveys.  Of course,  it is not  known
whether there are different degrees of under or overestimation of various types of income,  and it
is  difficult  to  correct  for  this  discrepancy.  If  we  assume  that  the  degree  of  under  or
overestimation  is  similar  across  the  various  income  sources,  then  the  estimated  income  shares
can be considered as approximations to first order of the actual true income shares6. This is what
is assumed in the empirical specification of the model.
Among  all  cocoa  producing  households  in  Ghana  30.5  percent  are  poor  according  to  the
classification  of the  GLSS.  In  the  rural  forest  the proportion  of poor  cocoa  producers  is 28.5
percent,  in other  rural areas  it is 38  percent,  and  among those  living in urban  areas  it is 41.2
percent.  These  proportions  are lower  than the poverty  incidence  among  non-cocoa households
that have  some income  from agriculture  (41  percent in the aggregate),  but much higher than  the
poverty incidence  among non-agriculture  producing households (7.9 percent).
To  analyze  the  uncertainty  presented  by the  various  agricultural  income  sources,  the  product
accounting for the largest share of income among all agricultural households in the GLSS in each
agricultural product group was  selected.  Thus maize was  selected to represent the cereals group,
cassava was chosen for the roots group, groundnuts  for the other cash crops group,  onions for the
vegetables  group,  and plantains  for the  fruit  group.  The processed  crop  group  as  well  as  the
group of other agricultural  income were assumed not to present uncertainties,  and the same was
assumed about the non-agricultural  sources of income.  This was done because of lack of relevant
data,  and also  because  the  emphasis  is on  agricultural  income.  The  assumption  would  tend to
bias  the  WTP  measure  downwards,  as,  under  the  assumption  of independence  between  the
variations  in agricultural  and other  sources  of income,  the  estimated unconditional  variance  of
first period resources in (23) would be smaller than the correct value.  Hence the calculated  WTP
would be smaller than the true WTP. The group of own consumed production does contribute to
real  income  uncertainty,  because  of yield  variability.  It was  assumed  to  consist  of maize  and
cassava in equal shares (there is no data in the GLSS to infer more precise shares).
With these assumptions time series of annual national  yields of the above crops plus cocoa were
regressed  on time  trends,  and  the residuals  were  utilized  to  compute  both  the  coefficients  of
6 An occasional  small negative  agricultural  income share is due to the fact that agricultural production expenditures
are subtracted from gross receipts, and these may some times be larger than the receipts.18
variation of the yields of the relevant products (and product  groups they represent) as well as the
correlation matrix of yields. Table 4 indicates the results  (only correlation  coefficients significant
at 10 percent or better were retained and reported).
Conceming world prices, the monthly world cocoa prices7 and the monthly prices of other traded
products  that are presumably  substitutes  for  Ghana's products  (maize,  groundnuts,  and  banana)
were first deflated by the US monthly consumer price index to express  them in real terms.  Then
for  each  product j  the  following  econometric  equation  was  estimated  (the  subscript  j  for  a
product is omitted for notational simplicity), where In is the natural logarithm8.
II
Aln p, = a0 + a,t + 6, A ln p,,  + ,i2 In Pe-2  + E  Ykmonthk  + 9,  (39)
k=1
In (39)  the variables monthk  are monthly dummies,  in order to take account of any seasonality at
the world level.  This equation is similar to what was estimated by Dehn (2000) in his analysis of
commodity price uncertainty.  It is based on the principle proposed by Ramey and Ramey (1995),
namely that  the  predictable  component  of a  price  series  can  be  modeled  using  a  selection  of
explanatory  variables.  The  variance  of the  residuals  can  then  be  thought  of as  uncertainty,
namely  the  unpredictable  component  of the  series.  Here,  as  in  Dehn  (2000)  we  adopt  a  time
series model with seasonal dummies  for the predictable  component of the price series
The equation  was estimated  with data from the period  1983  to  2002, except  for cocoa,  where  a
longer  time  series  was  available  (1970-2002)  and  was  utilized.  The  results  for  the  OLS
estimation  of (39)  are reported  in table 5. It can be seen that the coefficients of the lagged price
terms  are  all  significant.  The  coefficients  of all  the  linear  trends  are negative  and  significant,
implying  a negative  long  term  decline  in real  world  prices.  The  monthly dummies  are  for the
most part not-significant,  and this may be expected,  as world prices are influenced by production
in many countries, that have  different producing  seasons. The magnitudes of the estimated  price
9 coefficients imply stable (namely stationary) price processes9.
Concerning  domestic prices,  the monthly wholesale prices were deflated by the Ghana consumer
price index. Then the following regressions were estimatedl°.
Alnp, =ao +a 1t+fi,Alnp1,  +  I 2 lnp,I2 +40 AlnpT  +;,Alnpt,  +; 2Alnp 1>  +
(40)
71A ln PROD, + Irk  monthk  + SI
k=1
In  (40) the prices with superscript  w denote the (real) world price of the commodity  in question,
and PROD denotes the  domestic production of the commodity in the  crop year that includes the
month of the price in the  left hand side.  Since the production data  is annual,  the assumption was
7  The prices obtained were  the International  Cocoa Organization  (ICCO) prices, which are  regarded  as
representative  of the world market.
8  Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for unit roots of the world price series were borderline in rejecting the hypothesis
of a unit root for all of the commodities  considered except for banana,  where the test strongly rejected the
hypothesis of a unit root
9 If we define 6,=I+P I, and  °2 =P2 -P31  then stationarity  of the AR(2)  price process  in (41)  is implied by the
following conditions ABS(52 )<1,  6,  +52  <1  and  52  -61  <1  (see  Greene, 2000, p.  753).
'° Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for unit roots of the real domestic prices strongly rejected the hypothesis of a unit
root for all commodities considered.19
made that the same value  of this annual  variable pertains  to the prices of all months  within the
relevant  crop  year'1. The  coefficients  gk  are  meant  to  represent  the  different  degrees  of
"transmission"  of world prices  to domestic  prices.  If, for instance,  domestic  prices were strictly
determined by world prices in the same month, then the coefficient  CO should be equal to 1, and
all other coefficients  should be equal to zero. The additional lags  in world prices are designed to
capture the possibility of lagged transmission.
Equation  (40) was estimated  with data for the period  1983-1999,  which is the period of overlap
between our domestic price  data and our world price data,  and  for the three products  for which
we had corresponding  world price data (maize,  groundnuts, and plantain (for which banana data
was used)).  Table 6 presents the results of these regressions.  There are two notable observations.
First  in none of the equations  estimated  is the  world price  significant  for  either same  month
transmission  or  for  lagged  transmission.  This  implies  that  domestic  prices  for  the  major
agricultural  food  crops  in Ghana are  largely deternined  locally,  and  hence the products  can be
considered  as  nontradable.
Second, in none of the equations is the domestic production  variable significant  with the correct
sign, and in the one case (groundnut)  where it is significant it has the wrong (positive)  sign. This
non-significance  was  also found  in (not-reported)  regressions where  the crop  year was adjusted
by few  months backwards  and forward,  to capture  the possibility that the crop  years  might be
slightly different  than those adopted  for the regressions in table 6. This finding could be because
of the poor quality of production  data. However,  it may also be due to the fact that the estimated
regressions  include  seasonal  dummies  and these  capture  the  seasonal  pattern  of production.  In
fact, contrary to what was obtained for world prices, there are marked seasonal price patterns,  as
evidenced by the significant coefficients of several seasonal dummies in the relevant regressions
in table 6.  For instance,  in the maize regressions,  the negative  coefficients  for the  July, August
and  September  dummies  may  reflect  the fact  that  the bulk  of the  harvest  period  in the  south
occurs  in  these  months,  while  the  negative  dummy  for  November  coincides  with  the  peak
production period in the north of Ghana.  The positive value for the April dummy may reflect the
peak of the "dry" season,  namely the end of the previous year supplies, before  the new harvest
starts.
Given that world prices do not appear to matter  for domestic price formation,  and that we have
longer  price  series  for  domestic  prices  than  intemational  ones,  equations  similar  to  (40)  but
without the world price terms were estimated  for the period  1970-1999.  The results are exhibited
in  table  7  for  the  five  commodities  that  have  been  taken  as  representative  of the  various
agricultural income components.  It can be seen that the production  terms are still non-significant,
that  there  are  even  more  marked  seasonal  patterns,  and  that  the  two  lagged  price  terms  are
significant in all equations and with magnitudes that are compatible with stationarity of the price
process.
Given  the  lack  of transmission  of world prices  to' domestic  markets  for  all  food products,  the
correlations  between the  residuals of the  estimated regressions of different world prices are not
relevant  for  the  calculations  of the  WTP  and  are  not  shown.  For  the  domestic  prices,  the
correlation matrix of the residuals of the monthly prices is exhibited in table 8.
" The crop years differ among products  in Ghana,  depending  on the region of major production and the rainfall
pattern. They were specified after considering the timing of production in the major producing regions, as reported
by the Ghana ministry of agriculture. There is no officially recognized crop year for any product.20
6. Empirical estimates for the willingness  to pay for commodity  price insurance
Table 9 presents the actuarially  fair premiums (as  a share of the expected price at expiration)  for
a minimum price insurance  contract for cocoa written for  a fixed amount of the commodity  and
for various  strike  prices  (all expressed  as percent  of difference  from  the expected  future price),
and various  months  to  maturity.  'The  premiums  are  per  unit  quantity  insured,  and  the  annual
interest  rate  assumed  is  5 percent  (adjusted  to  monthly basis).  The  price  series  utilized  is  the
international ICCO one,  and the values  are computed using formulas  for  censored  distributions
as  discussed earlier,  with conditional  variances  for n  periods before  expiration  computed  from
the estimated  world price model for cocoa exhibited in table 5. As that price model is stationary,
the  conditional  variances  do  not  depend  on  current prices,  and  hence  these  premiums  can  be
considered  as the unconditional average  values for the actuarially fair levels.
It can be seen that these premiums are substantial.  They also increase considerably with duration
of the insurance contract.  For instance for six months to maturity, they range from 3.3  percent of
the  expected  future  price  if the  strike  price  is  10  percent  below  expected  future  price,  to  13
percent  if the insurance  provides  for minimum  price  at  10 percent  above  the  expected price  at
maturity.  For  12  months  to  maturity they range  from  5.4 percent  to  14.9 percent  for  the  same
type of contract.  The large  values of these premiums  are due to the fact that, while the estimated
cocoa  price  model  is  stationary,  it  is  not  too  far  from  a  unit  root.  Hence  the  variances  of
conditional  predictions  of prices n  months  ahead,  tend to  increase  considerably.  As discussed
earlier these figures indicate  the minimum benefit to producers,  and hence their theoretical WTP,
under a perfect market,  and no risk aversion.
The expected prices at maturity that are underlying the calculations  in table 9 can be either actual
future  market  prices,  if such  markets  exist,  or  current  best  forecasts  of prices  at  maturity  if
futures markets  do not exist.  This does not imply that futures prices, if they exist, are necessarily
the  market  determined  expectations  of subsequent  prices.  If we  assume,  for  instance  that  the
producer  has  a  different  forecasting  model  of prices,  and  consistently  forecasts  prices  to  be
within a constant differential  from  observed futures  prices (higher  or lower),  then his actuarially
fair WTP exhibited in table  9 would be the  same, but as a share  of his own  expected prices  and
not the observed futures  prices.
The  estimated  actuarially  fair premiums  are  generally  smaller  than  the  market  determined  put
option prices.  Table  10 compares for illustration  the prices of cocoa put options  in the New York
Board of Trade (NYBOT) in June 5, 2002, February 2, 2001,  and April  4, 2000, for three month
maturities,  and  different  strike  prices  and  compares  them  with  the  actuarially  fair  insurance
premiums  calculated  with the  formulas here,  for the exact  same deviations  of strike prices  from
future prices  as the ones  actually  observed  in the market.  Table  11  does the  same  for  two and
five month put options and for different dates12.
Note that with only one exception,  namely the July 5, 2000 prices,  in all other cases the market
determined  put option prices are higher  than the ones predicted by the actuarially  fair insurance
premiums computed here.  This suggests that risk neutral and/or perfect consumption  smoothing
households, would not be interested in market based commodity price insurance.
Consider  now  the  adjustments  to  this  actuarially  fair  WTP  that  are  induced  by  the  portfolio
structure  of income. As indicated in formula (23) there are two terms that multiply the combined
12 These comparisons  were done for several  other dates and maturities, and the results are similar.21
risk aversion cum consumption smoothing parameter 0. The first is the unconditional variance of
period  I  resources,  while  the  second is a term  that depends  on the conditional  variance  of the
contract  return,  as  well  as  the  conditional  covariance  between  the  contract  return  and  the
deviation  of period  2 household  resources  from trend.  Both of these  terms were  elaborated  in
section  4.  The formulas  of section  (4) along  with the domestic  price series models indicated  in
table  7,  and  the  structure  of incomes  indicated  in  tables  1-3  were  utilized  to  estimate  these
formulas for the case of Ghanaian  cocoa producers.
Table  12  indicates  the  unconditional  coefficients  of variation  of second  period  income  of
Ghanaian households  due to agricultural risks. The computed coefficients  of variation take into
account  only  agricultural  income,  and neglect  variability  in any other source of income,  hence,
under  the assumption  of independence between  agricultural  and other sources  of income, they
can  be  regarded  as  lower  bounds  of the  income  risks  faced  by  Ghanaian  cocoa  producing
households.  It  is,  of  course,  assumed  that  the  price  risk  facing  Ghanaian  households  is  the
international  price  risk,  and  hence  we  do  not  consider  the  reductions  in price  risk  due  to  the
stabilization  activities  of  the  government  parastatal  Cocobod.  The  implication  is  that  the
indicated  risks  are  the  ones  that  would  be  faced  by  cocoa  producing  households  under  a
liberalized system, namely without Cocobod.
It can  be noticed  that  the  income  risks  vary positively  with  the  share of cocoa  in  household
income.  Households with low exposure to cocoa (cocoa income share less than 20 percent)  have
small coefficients of variation (between  1.2 and  13.1 percent) irrespective of whether their share
of agriculture  in total income  is large (namely larger than  60 percent)  or small. By contrast, the
households  that have large  shares  of cocoa  in total  income (cocoa  income  share larger than  40
percent)  have much  larger  coefficients  of variation  of income  (between  19  and  31.5  percent).
This is  despite  the fact,  that,  as  is obvious  from  tables  4 and  6,  both the  yield  as well as the
monthly domestic price variations of the other products are often larger than those of cocoa.  The
reason  is  that  the  unconditional  variance  of the  international  cocoa  price,  implied  by  the
estimated  time series models, is much  larger than the unconditional  price variances of domestic
products  (except  for  cassava,  which  is a  largely  subsistence  crop)13. Hence  larger exposure  to
cocoa implies larger overall unconditional  income variability.
In  the  estimates  presented  below,  the value  of the  consumption  smoothing  parameter  is set  at
either  0.5  or 0.8,  for all households,  and  this represents  mild and  low consumption smoothing
respectively.  As for the coefficient  of relative risk aversion  p, perusal  of the literature  revealed
that there is a range of empirical estimates.  Binswanger (1980) for instance found the parameter
to be in the range .32 to 1.74,  Antle (1987) found relative risk aversion to lie between  .19 and
1.77,  while Kurosaki  (1998)  found the coefficient  to  lie between  1.12  and 3.34.  It thus appears
that a range of 0.2 and 3.5 is reasonable,  albeit quite large. For the estimates reported here three
3  The  unconditional  price  variance  for  an AR(2)  stationary  price model similar to  the  ones  estimated,  and of the
form  p,  = y,p, 1 + r2Pt-2 + e6,  where  the  error  epsilon  is  iid,  can  be  derived  from  the  solution  to  the
corresponding  Yule-Walker  equations,  and is given by the following  formula (which is different from the incorrect
one given in Green, 2000, p. 755)
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values  of the relative  risk  aversion were adopted,  namely  0.4,  2  and  3. Only  three experiments
are reported for lack of space, namely one with f3=0.5,  and p=0.4 (hence 0=0.2),  one with ,B=0.5,
and  p=2  (hence 0=1),  and one with  3=0.8,  and  p=3  (hence  0=2.4).  The first  experiment can be
considered  as representing  relatively  moderate  smoothing with low risk aversion,  the second  an
intermediate  case,  and the  last  can be thought  of as one representing  little smoothing  and large
risk aversion.  Clearly many cases lie in between.
Tables  13,14, and  15  present the  estimates of the implied benefit of  Ghanaian  cocoa producing
households  in  the three  regions  distinguished  (rural  forest,  other  rural,  and  urban),  under  the
three  different hypotheses  concerning the risk aversion  and consumption smoothing parameters,
and for periods  to  maturity of six and  12 months respectively.  All figures  are reported  as shares
of the household cocoa income, but the cocoa income shares in total income  are also reported, so
that one can easily compute  the WTP values as shares of total income.  This is done for reference
in tables  16-18.  Clearly larger values of the cocoa income  share imply larger values of the WTP
as share of total income.
The first  observation  is that the various  WTP estimates  differ considerably  for different  types of
households.  This is to be expected  as the households differ considerably among  them both with
respect  to  their  income  sources,  as  well  as  their  dependence  on  cocoa  and  agriculture.
Households  with  large  dependence  on  cocoa  exhibit,  as  expected,  considerably  larger  WTP
estimates.  For instance if we consider  for the exposition the insurance  that provides  a minimum
price equal  to the currently  expected  future price (namely  a strike price that differs by 0 percent
from  the  future  expected  price),  then  the  WTP  for  households  in  the  rural  forest  region,  the
largest cocoa growing region in Ghana,  as a share of total income (table  16)  and for  a six month
in advance contract range from 0.5 percent to 5 percent of total income in the case of the  lowest
value of the parameter  0, and from  0.8 to  13.2 percent of income in the case of the highest value
of 0.  For the other two regions (tables  16 and  17)  the ranges are equally extreme.  These  are very
large numbers and suggest that there is a large potential benefit from providing price insurance  in
areas where there is large dependence  on cocoa.
The  second  observation  is  that  the  estimated  WTP  measures  differ  considerably,  and  are
generally  larger,  than  the actuarially  fair values of table 9.  Consider,  for instance the  figures  in
table  13, that present  WTP estimates for the cocoa households  in the rural forest region as shares
of cocoa income,  and  as  such are  comparable  to the  figures of table  9. Comparing  the columns
for  each  group  of simulations  in  table  13  with  the  rows  for month  6  and  month  12  before
maturity  from table  9, it can be seen  that for the low theta cases the differences  are not large,  as
expected.  However,  for the highest  theta cases  the  differences  are  substantial.  For instance  the
WTP for poor households  that  have  cocoa  income  share larger  than 40 percent  and  agricultural
income  share larger than 60 percent,  the estimates  for WTP for the six month advance period in
the highest theta case,  are between  18 and  28.7 percent depending on the strike price, while the
actuarially  fair  premium  is  between  3.3  and  13  percent.  The  differences  are  larger  than  100
percent  in all  cases, which  suggests that potential benefits  from  commodity price insurance  are
heavily  underestimated  in  such settings  if one  applies  the  techniques  for  computing  actuarially
fair  premiums,  that  have  been  utilized  in developed  countries.  It  also  suggests  that  high  risk
aversion  and the  lack  of appropriate  consumption  smoothing  for covariate  risks  may make the
benefits from providing safety nets in the form of commodity price  insurance quite large.23
A large part of the difference  between actuarially  fair values  and the reported WTP estimates  is
accounted  for  by the  contribution  of the  unconditional  income  variance  term,  which  in  the
estimates stays constant  over the different  maturity periods.  Table  19 indicates the proportions  of
the  WTP  accounted  for by  the  actuarially  fair  component,  the unconditional  variance  and  the
conditional terms indicated in equation (23). The case illustrated is for a strike price equal to the
expected  future price,  and for six and twelve months in advance of maturity.  It can be seen that
the conditional terms never account for more than 7 percent of the WTP, while the unconditional
variance term accounts for substantial parts of the WTP, sometimes exceeding  70 percent.
The final comment concerns the case where the quantity insured of the commodity is whatever is
produced,  irrespective of amount.  In other words the  idea is that the  insurance  contract offers  a
minimum price but  on a variable  quantity,  and  hence resembles  what many  governments  have
done for their producers.  The results point out that the estimates of WTP are quite close to what
was  already  indicated  in  tables  13-18.  In  other words  the  average  WTP  does  not  increase  by
large noticeable amounts (normally of the order of 0.1 percent of income or less)  if the insurance
contract  covers only what is produced  and not a fixed amount, irrespective of actual production.
This suggests  that as far as price  insurance is concerned a fixed quantity contract  is worth to the
households  over  time  about  as  much  as  a  contract  providing  minimum  price only on what  is
produced.
7. Comparisons with market based option prices
An important question from the viewpoint of providing market based commodity price insurance
is  whether  the  estimated  benefit  or WTP  compare  with the market  determined  prices  of put
options  in organized  commodity exchanges.  Tables  20 and  21  try to answer this by comparing,
for the rural region of Ghana14, the estimated WTP with the methodology presented here, for the
same strike prices (relative  to the future prices)  as observed in the market, with the actual cocoa
put option prices for three months (table 20) and five months (table 21)  in advance of maturity,
in  the  New  York  Board  of Trade.  All  estimates  of WTP  have  been  computed  under  the
assumption that  a producer obtains  price insurance  for  a fixed amount  equal  to  100 percent  of
average production,  and for the same values of the parameters  P and p (and hence 0) as the ones
simulated in tables  12-17. All WTP figures are presented as shares of cocoa income, which, since
the  assumption  is that producers insure  100 percent of their  average  production,  translates to  a
WTP that can be expressed  as a share of the average  future cocoa price. In this fashion the WTP
figures  and the observed  put option prices,  which are  expressed  as functions  of the underlying
future prices, are directly comparable.
Table  20 shows  for put option prices observed on June 5,  2002, that for the low theta case,  the
estimated WTP is below the market based put option prices for some households,  namely those
with  low  cocoa  dependence,  but  is  higher  than  the  market  based  put  option  prices  for  the
households  with high cocoa  dependence.  The  difference,  however,  between  the  WTP  and  the
market based put option prices  becomes  considerably  larger  when  the value  of 0 is large.  For
instance in the last set of row, which indicate the values of WTP when 0 is 2.4, it appears that in
all cases,  namely for all  strike  prices,  and for all  types of households,  the  WTP is much larger
than the market based put option prices.
14 Estimates for the other regions lead to similar conclusions24
The  same conclusion  can be  drawn from  table  21, which  indicates  for  a different  date  (July  5,
2000) the same comparisons  as in table 20, but for five month options.  For the lowest  0  , all the
estimated  WTP  figures  are  below  the  market  based  put  option  prices.  However,  for  the  two
higher  0 cases,  all  estimates  of WTP  are  higher,  and  in  some  cases  considerably  so,  than  the
market  based  put  option  prices.  This  suggests,  that  commodity  price  insurance  for  such
households based  on buying put options in organized exchanges  is a viable proposition.
8. Concluding remarks
The benefit of providing  commodity  insurance  to agricultural  producers  is difficult  to estimate
empirically.  The  reason  is that  it  involves  the  assessment  of both a  short term  benefit,  namely
one under the assumption of no change in production pattern,  as well as long term benefit, which
involves  the  implications  of insurance  for  diversification  and  general  production  and  income
structure of the household.  This paper has concentrated  on the first of these benefits.
The theory presented here has pointed out that the benefits  from commodity price  insurance are
more complex  than simple  actuarially  fair insurance premiums.  This is  because of risk  aversion
as  well  as  different  degrees  of consumption  smoothing practiced by households.  These  factors
are  quite important  in developing  countries  where  considerable  liquidity constraints,  as well  as
lack of adequate safety nets, imply that households  are less well protected  against income shocks
than  in  developed  countries.  The  implication  of these  factors,  as  far  as  the  benefit  from
commodity insurance  is concerned,  is  that the WTP  depends  on current  income conditions,  and
also on the correlation of the return of the insured commodity contract with household income.
The methodology  for  estimating  the WTP  was empirically  implemented  with data for Ghana,  a
country with large dependence  on cocoa.  It was  seen that there are many  Ghanaian  households,
with significant  dependence of income  on cocoa,  and  many of them  are poor.  It was  also  seen
that these households  are subject  to considerable  income variability  induced  by dependence  on
agriculture  as well as cocoa.
The  estimated  price  models  utilized  for  the  estimates,  were  largely  parsimonious  time  series
ones,  and suggested  that  the  prices  of the  most important  food commodities  in  Ghana  are not
related  to  international  prices.  Nevertheless,  they  seem  to  follow  stationary  processes,  with
marked  seasonalities.  The  international  cocoa  prices  on the  other  hand  seem  to  follow  a  time
series model that  is close to a unit root process.  The implication  is that the conditional variances
of future cocoa prices are large and stabilize only slowly. This implies that the unpredictability or
volatility of cocoa prices,  when examined  ex-ante,  is significant and increasing with the period
of the prediction.
Estimates  of actuarially  fair  values  of the premiums  for commodity  price  insurance  suggested
that they are  not  only large,  and increasing with the  distance  from  contract expiration,  but that
they seem to be smaller than the actually observed prices of put-options traded in internationally
organized  commodity  exchanges,  such  as  the  NYBOT.  This  suggests  that  risk  neutral-
households,  or perfectly  consumption  smoothing  households  would  not  have  any demand  for
market based commodity price insurance.
When,  however,  the total WTP is computed,  namely including the terms that the theory suggests
are important for developing  country producers,  then the resulting  WTP estimates  are larger than
the  actuarially  fair  values,  and  many  times  by amounts  larger  than  100  percent.  They  differ25
considerably  among households,  with the estimates for households  with large  cocoa dependence
much larger than those for households with low cocoa dependence.
The  fact that the  magnitudes of the estimated  benefits  are  large,  and  larger than the  actuarially
fair values,  suggests  that producers  of cocoa  in  Ghana,  if exposed  to  the  full  force  of world
prices,  should be willing to pay the premiums  for price  insurance  contracts  of the type that was
analyzed,  and  which  could be profitably  obtained  from organized  commodity exchanges.  This
was shown by comparing the estimated WTP figures and the actual prices of cocoa put options in
the  New  York  Board  of  Trade.  The  comparison  revealed  that  under  assumptions  that  seem
reasonable  in  developing  countries,  a  large  number  of producers  would obtain  benefits  from
commodity price  insurance  larger than the premiums  suggested by the private  markets.  Thus it
appears  that local marketing  intermediaries  like Cocobod or others  could easily incorporate  the
insurance  premiums  from  buying put options  into minimum  forward prices  offered to  farmers,
and that farmers would be amenable to such contracts.
A major conclusion of the analysis is that, as the estimated  WTP  figures differ considerably  for
different  types of farm households,  not  all  farmers  would be equally  willing to pay  for market
based commodity insurance.  This is because  farmers will  differ in their consumption  smoothing
behavior  as  well  as  in  their  attitudes  towards  risk.  The  general  finding  from  the  empirical
analysis  was  that farmers  with larger dependence  on cocoa,  as well  as those  that  are more risk
averse  and do not manage to  smooth  consumption  (and these  are more  likely to be  the poorer
farmers),  would obtain  larger benefit  from  commodity  price  insurance.  This  suggests  that  the
total  demand  for market  based commodity  price  insurance  will depend  on the  structure  of the
commodity producing households.
The  analysis concerned  cocoa and Ghana,  and it is not clear whether the results would  apply to
other settings with different types of commodities,  and producers.  For instance,  it is not clear  at
all,  a-priori,  as was  found  for Ghana,  that the  more dependent  a household  is on the  insurable
commodity,  the larger will be his overall income coefficient of variation.  This clearly depends  on
the  portfolio  of activities,  coupled  with  the  stochastic  nature  of these  activities,  and  is  not
expected to be the same in every country, and for every commodity.  The same holds as far as the
risk and consumption  smoothing characteristics  of households  are concerned.  While  a range of
reasonable  values  was  considered,  it  is  not  clear  whether  the  bulk  of the  cocoa  producing
households  in Ghana  will have parameters compatible  with significant  WTP.  This suggests that
several  similar studies  for other commodities  and  countries,  and also panel  survey based studies
to obtain the relevant parameters are needed, before one concludes beyond reasonable doubt, that
there  is  significant  benefit  as  well  as  demand  for providing  market  based  commodity  price
insurance, on a large scale..
While the analysis here considered  only price insurance, the theoretical  framework could readily
be  applied to yield insurance  as well.  While there may be considerable  WTP for yield insurance
by farmers,  from  an insurer's viewpoint there are  considerable moral  hazard problems,  as  yield
can be influenced by farmers.  This is in contrast to price insurance,  which is based on a variable
that cannot  be  influenced  by individual  farmers.  It  is  such  moral  hazard  problems  that  have
induced the search  for alternatives  such as rainfall insurance'  Nevertheless,  the WTP  for rainfall
insurance  can  be  estimated  with  similar  methods,  but this  is  something  that  is  left  for  future
research.26
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Appendix.  Covariance  between  the return to  price insurance and the  underlying  price of
the crop.
Consider the  covariance between  the  return to the price  insurance  contract  and  the price of the
underlying  commodity,  that was encountered  in formula  (29)  in the text  (the  superscripts  r and
the subscript c are eliminated for simplicity of notation).
E[(r - E(r))(Ap)] = E[(r  - E(r))(p - pe)]=
Prob(r  = O)E[(-E(r))(p  - pe)(p 2 Ps]+  (Al)
Prob(r  > O)E[(r-E(r))(p- pe)(p < Ps)]
The expectation of r can be derived from standard  formulas  for the expected value of a truncated
norrnal variable (Greene, 2000, p. 907), and is not discussed further.
The following formulas now apply.
Pr ob(r = 0) = Prob(p 2 ps) = 1- D(/3)  (A2)
Prob(r > 0) = Prob(p < ps) = (D(fi)  (A3)
Where  + and (D  will denote the probability distribution and cumulative distribution of the
standardized normal variable., and:
((Ps  _pe)  (A4)
The term multiplying the first probability in the last part of (Al) can be written using the
formulas  for the expected  value and variance of a truncated normal variable as follows.
E[(-E(r))(p-_pe)|(2  Ps]=  -E(r)E[(p  pe|)I(p  ps)]= -E(r)a  0-  )  (A5)
To estimate the term multiplying the second probability in the last part of (Al) we define the
following expectation.
pS-E[pj(p < p,  )] = pe _ or (IJ(I)
Then we can write the term multiplying the second probability in the last part of (Al) as follows
E[(r  - E(r))(p - Pe  )I(P < Ps)]  = E[(ps - p - E(r))(p - pe)I(p < Ps)]
E[(p  - pe  -E(r)  - (P-P  p))(P  -Ps + Ps-P  p)I(P < Ps)](6
(ps  p  - E(r))(ps  - pe)  - Var[pj(p < PS)]  =
(ps - pe - E(r))(ps _ pe) _-  a22[I -_3(f)]
Where
6(p) = A(4A(°8  -1  4  i(p) = - 06(f)  (AX30
Table  1. Structure of income of cocoa  producing households  in the rural forest region
Rural forest
Share of cocoa in household  income
0-20%  20-40%  >40%
Share of agriculture in household  income  Share of agriculture in household  Share of agriculture  in household  income
income
<60%  >60%  <60%  >60%  <60%  >60%
Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Non-  Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Non-
Estimated number of
households in Ghana  18668  50048  47133  106948  3983  11068  23540  64912  979  2855  23017  58395
Share of total
households  (%)  0.42  1.12  1.05  2.39  0.09  0.25  0.53  1.45  0.02  0.06  0.51  1.31
Share of total income
from (%)
Wages  26.79  21.94  1.34  2.19  16.58  14.49  1.93  2.01  0.00  41.84  1.06  1.03
Agriculture  40.95  30.09  90.60  87.93  44.74  44.07  90.26  90.57  51.50  55.56  89.71  92.34
Non-farm self-
employment  23.25  30.71  4.68  5.84  28.41  15.64  3.02  4.43  12.90  0.00  4.41  3.65
Rents (actual  and
imputed)  1.66  3.73  1.34  1.18  1.20  2.37  1.87  0.93  28.33  2.28  2.30  1.53
Remittances  6.37  8.35  1.56  2.41  3.45  10.58  2.87  1.79  5.64  0.32  1.62  0.94
Other activities  0.98  5.18  0.48  0.45  5.62  12.86  0.05  0.27  1.63  0.00  0.90  0.51
Per capita  income (000
cedi/year)  338  1102  446  1028  678  783  371  1183  204  813  495  1199
Per capita  expenditure
(000 cedi/year)
458  1633  490  1241  420  1232  525  1275  596  1016  498  1433
Share of total income
from (%)
Cocoa  6.77  6.08  8.61  8.87  26.42  26.13  31.73  28.60  42.16  46.85  53.47  56.59
Cereals  2.16  1.31  5.33  3.01  0.11  1.49  3.45  1.95  0.00  0.00  1.62  1.84
Other Cash Crops  0.28  1.51  0.45  0.51  0.00  0.00  0.86  0.08  0.00  0.00  0.05  0.07
Roots  2.80  3.23  18.37  14.36  0.39  0.13  5.28  10.98  0.00  0.00  1.92  2.47
Fruits  0.52  0.89  8.55  10.82  0.74  0.33  3.18  3.98  0.00  0.00  1.84  0.52
Vegetables  0.14  1.08  7.08  4.30  0.60  1.68  2.06  1.99  0.00  0.00  0.72  0.63
Processed Crops  4.48  1.21  11.59  10.57  2.23  0.00  3.37  5.43  0.00  0.00  6.75  3.38
Other Agriculture  0.07  0.22  1.78  0.94  0.06  0.25  2.70  0.33  0.00  0.24  0.25  0.50
Consumption of own
Production  23.74  14.56  28.84  34.55  14.1 9  14.06  37.64  37.23  9.35  8.47|  23.08  26.34
All agriculture  40.95  30.09  90.60  87.93  44.74  44.071  90.26  90.57  51.50  55.56  89.71  92.34
Source. Author's calculations  from the GLSS31
Table 2. Structure of income of cocoa producing households in the other rural areas
Other rural
Share of cocoa in household  income
0-20%  20-40%  >40%
Share of agriculture  in household income  Share of agriculture in household  Share of agriculture  in household  income
______  ______  __  ___  ______  _____incom  e
<60%  >60%  <60%  >60%  <60%  >60%
Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Non-  Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Non-
Poor  Poor
Estimated number of
households in Ghana  6957  14251  8975  11411  1980  389  2279  643  2421  1031
Share of total
households (%)  0.16  0.32  0.20  0.26  0.04  0.01  0.05  0.01  0.05  0.02
Share of total income
from (%)
Wages  0.00  23.57  1.52  3.63  26.41  0.00  10.71  0.00  0.00  0.00
Agriculture  45.31  33.11  82.09  85.30  49.16  97.97  80.13  54.92  98.10  97.20
Non-farm self-
employment  40.42  33.98  9.17  8.50  10.71  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Rents (actual  and
imputed)  2.07  0.79  3.01  0.90  8.83  2.03  6.29  16.75  1.39  2.60
Remittances  12.06  5.43  3.34  1.07  1.58  0.00  1.87  28.34  0.50  0.20
Other activities  0.14  3.12  0.86  0.59  3.32  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Per capita income (000
cedi/year)  276  871  188  922  625  509  513  176  502  222
Per capita expenditure
(000 c  edilyear)
455  961  459  1247  1045  531  1209  116  440  1077
Share of total Income
from (%)
Cocoa  5.80  2.55  10.64  6.57  35.08  37.59  23.14  42.51  61.63  48.49
Cereals  1.95  3.87  3.90  4.19  1.06  1.96  2.38  0.00  1.18  0.00
Other Cash Crops  0.07  0.17  -0.01  0.38  0.73  0.98  2  12  0.00  0.07  0.00
Roots  8.39  6.62  7.09  11.31  0.00  0.00  18.59  0.00  3.09  4.84
Fruits  7.23  0.00  3.97  8.77  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Vegetables  1.55  0.00  0.21  2.41  0.28  0.00  0.99  0.00  2.63  0.00
Processed Crops  0.00  0.00  9.64  5.13  0.00  2.56  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Other Agriculture  4.77  9.33  0.67  0.67  0.91  0.00  0.24  0.00  0.00  0.58
Consumption of own
Production  15.54  10.56  45.98  45.88  11.10  54.881  32.68  12.41  29.50  43.29
All agriculture  45.31  33.11  82.09  85.30  49.16  97.97  80.131  54.92  98.101  97.20
Source. Author's calculations  from the GLSS32
Table 3. Structure of income of cocoa producing  households in urban areas
Urban
Share of cocoa in household  income
0-20%  20-40%  >40%
Share of agriculture  in household  income  Share of agriculture in  household  Share of agriculture  in household  income
income
<60%  >60%  <60%  >60%  <60%  >60%
Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Non-  Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Non-
Poor  Po
Estimated number of
households  in Ghana  5254  10081  4140  3273  411  1719  4409  5014  2227  3378
Share  of total
households (%)  0.12  0.23  0.09  0.07  0.01  0.04  0.10  0.11  0.05  0.08
Share of total income
from (%)
Wages  37.83  7.97  1.25  2.79  0.00  42.75  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Agriculture  24.39  10.05  88.96  91.70  57.19  34.68  81.82  68.27  88.37  78.53
Non-farm self-
employment  22.21  64.68  4.28  0.00  0.00  17.87  6.01  22.05  0.00  9.14
Rents (actual and
imputed)  4.27  1.40  2.88  0.76  2.24  0.00  3.00  1.47  8.19  4.81
Remittances  3.58  8.59  2.11  4.75  0.00  4.26  9.17  7.49  3.38  7.34
Other activities  7.72  7.31  0.52  0.00  40.57  0.43  0.00  0.72  0.06  0.19
Per capita income  (000
cedi/year)  342  816  297  1027  320  667  416  1035  377  408
Per capita expenditure
(000 cedi/year)  476  1543  484  1372  506  4355  615  1890  452  1020
Share of total income
from (%)
Cocoa  7.80  2.29  12.42  3.56  26.42  23.51  26.40  24.79  70.01  60.68
Cereals  0.91  0.46  4.47  4.45  0.00  1.69  4.01  2.74  1.14  2.55
Other Cash Crops  0.03  0.43  2.99  0.03  0.00  0.13  0.06  0.20  1.89  0.00
Roots  1.23  0.34  28.02  25.82  0.00  0.00  15.11  5.61  0.77  0.43
Fruits  0.00  0.31  9.50  21.59  20.18  0.00  2.65  3.14  3.92  0.00
Vegetables  0.00  0.26  3.84  2.63  0.00  0.00  2.39  1.35  0.62  0.00
Processed Crops  2.06  1.17  2.53  3.57  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Other Agriculture  0.20  0.16  0.18  0.34  0.00  3.49  1.08  2.17  0.31  1.09
Consumption of own
Production  12.16  4.62  25.00  29.71  10.59  5.86  30.11  28.28  9.71  13.79
All agriculture  24.39  10.05  88.96  91.70  57.  34.68  81.82  68.27  88.37  78.53
Source. Author's calculations  from the GLSS33
Table 4. Coefficients  of variation and correlation matrix of domestic  production yields (only
significant correlations at 10% or better are shown)
Correlation matrix
Coefficient  Consumption
of variation  Cocoa  Maize  Groundnuts Cassava  Plantain  Onions  of own
Production
Cocoa  0.200  1.000
Maize  0.176  0.452  1.000
Groundnuts  0.225  -0.288  1.000
Cassava  0.132  0.496  -0.566  1.000
Plantain  0.116  0.366  0.563  0.440  1.000
Onions  0.167  -0.281  -0.519  -0.358  1.000
Consumption of
ownProduction  0.128  0.611  -0.539  0.990  0.491  -0.518  1.000
Source. Computed by author
Table 5. Results of time series regressions  for world monthly prices of products relevant to Ghana
(Dependent  variable is Alnxt where xt is the deflated world  monthly price of the reported
commodity)
Cocoa  Maize  Banana  Groundnuts
Independent  Coefficient  Statistic  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Statistic Statistic  ~Statistic  StatisticStisc
variable
Constant  0.0345*  1.777  0.0336**  2.142  0.6633***  5.998  0.1175***  2.950
Linear trend  -0.0001**  -1.991  -0.0002**  -2.115  -0.0008***  -3.730  -0.0001**  -2.229
A1nx 1 _l  0.1560***  3.045  0.2960***  4.636  -0.4703***  -6.923  0.3549***  5.681
hlXz- 2 -0.0181**  -2.199  -0.0484***  -2.805  -0.3656***  -6.000  -0.0480***  -3.093
January  0.0194  1.162  -0.0003  -0.019  0.1179**  2.231  -0.0020  -0.115
February  -0.0187  -1.120  -0.0167  -1.032  0.1926***  3.578  -0.0141  -0.815
March  0.0101  0.609  0.0158  0.991  0.0768  1.394  0.0058  0.341
April  -0.0169  -1.010  -0.0182  -1.125  0.0611  1.080  0.0190  1.100
May  -0.0059  -0.353  -0.0048  -0.295  -0.0254  -0.451  0.0077  0.444
June  -0.0094  -0.564  -0.0066  -0.405  -0.0520  -0.934  0.0068  0.392
July  0.0132  0.792  -0.0378**  -2.331  -0.0372  -0.686  -0.0010  -0.059
August  -0.0096  -0.577  -0.0260  -1.587  -0.0274  -0.511  0.0158  0.916
September  0.0111  0.668  -0.0236  -1.441  0.0020  0.038  -0.0254  -1.464
October  -0.0184  -1.101  0.0046  0.279  -0.1292**  -2.430  0.0079  0.453
November  0.0019  0.112  -0.0014  -0.084  -0.0440  -0.820  0.0043  0.246
Adjusted R-squared  0.0344  0.1686  0.3055  0.1719
S.E. of regression  0.0667  0.0498  0.1627  0.0533
Source. Computed by author.  One asterisk denotes significance at the  10 % level, two asterisks denote significance  at 5%,
and three  asterisks denote significance  at 1%.34
Table 6. Results of time series regressions  for domestic  monthly prices of products relevant to
Ghana (Dependent  variable is AInxt  where xt is the deflated domestic  monthly national wholesale
price of the reported commodity,  and XW is the relevant world price. Estimation period is  1983-
1999)
Maize  Groundnut  Plantain
Coefficient  t-Statistic  Coefficient  t-Statistic  Coefficien  t-statistic
Constant  -0.4746  -0.612  1.1206**  2.488  1.9182  1.629
Linear trend  -0.0004  -1.525  -0.0007***  -3.276  0.0005  1.131
lnX(t-2)  -0.0843***  -3.040  -0.2595***  -4.440  0.3408***  -5.071
AlnX(t-1)  -0.1321*  -1.820  -0.5443***  -7.786  0.5333***  -7.394
AlnXW(t)  -0.1153  -0.696  0.1820  1.230  0.0953  1.117
AInXW(t-1)  -0.0713  -0.412  -0.0441  -0.279  0.0261  0.291
AlnXW(t-2)  0.0016  0.010  0.0444  0.299  -0.0574  -0.673
lnPRODX(t)  0.0794  1.307  0.0610**  2.083  -0.0687  -0.798
January  0.0297  0.738  0.0073  0.180  -0.0375  -0.500
February  -0.0102  -0.253  0.0740*  1.816  0.0178  0.230
March  0.0379  0.926  0.0304  0.737  -0.0254  -0.322
April  0.0897**  2.215  0.0532  1.307  0.0233  0.307
May  0.0118  0.293  0.0562  1.376  0.3656***  4.914
June  0.0127  0.308  0.0308  0.748  0.2156***  2.749
July  -0.0865**  -2.059  0.0760*  1.842  0.1905**  2.568
August  -0.2786***  -6.326  0.0441  1.059  0.1404*  1.891
September  -0.2485***  -5.003  -0.1018**  -2.411  0.0565  0.763
October  0.0011  0.023  -0.1113**  -2.586  -0.0126  -0.169
November  0.1079***  2.711  -0.0285  -0.693  -0.0008  -0.011
Adjusted R-squared  0.5052  0.3158  0.3366
S.E. of regression  0.1129  0.1150  0.2094
Source.  Computed by author.  One asterisk denotes significance  at the 10 % level, two asterisks denote
significance  at 5%, and three asterisks denote significance  at 1%.35
Table 7 Results of time series regressions  for domestic  monthly prices of products relevant to
Ghana (Dependent  variable is AlExt where xt is the deflated domestic  monthly national wholesale
price of the re  rted commodity.  Estimation period is 1970-1999)
Maize  Groundnut  Plantain  Cassava  Onions
Coefficient  s  cCoefficient  S  iCoefficient  St  tit  Coefficient  t-Statistic  Coefficient  t-Statistic StatisticSttsiSaitc
Constant  0.7028*  1.873  0.9172***  2.604  0.6835  0.880  2.7962**  2.307  2.3876***  6.550
Linear trend  -0.0003*  -1.918  -0.0003***  -3.672  0.0002  1.075  0.0001  0.107  -0.0007***  -4.705
InX(t-2)  -0.1152***  -4.174  -0.1784***  -4.910  -0.2894***  -6.204  -0.2402***  -6.018  -0.3355***  -7.742
AlnX(t-1)  -0.2404***  -4.480  -0.4653***  -8.950  -0.5328***  -10.007  -0.3894***  -7.259  -0.2918***  -5.393
InPRODX(t)  -0.0004  -0.014  0.0248  1.046  0.0132  0.234  -0.1113  -1.331  0.0018  0.092
January  0.0918**  2.438  0.0501  1.610  0.0051  0.089  0.1714**  2.149  -0.2014***  -4.208
February  0.0691*  1.862  0.0834***  2.668  -0.0415  -0.724  0.0830  1.030  -0.1985***  -4.015
March  0.0416  1.122  0.0575**  1.850  -0.0507-  -0.881  -0.0534  -0.674  -0.2948***  -5.996
April  0.1103***  2.955  0.0507  1.633  -0.0965*  -1.670  0.0936  1.186  -0.2015***  -3.920
May  0.1013***  2.722  0.0607**  1.958  0.3337***  5.725  0.0397  0.500  -0.1185**  -2.289
June  0.0608  1.613  0.0439  1.403  0.2677***  4.408  -0.0412  -0.521  -0.0678  -1.323
July  -0.0437  -1.144  0.0770**  2.463  0.2094***  3.603  -0.0420  -0.532  0.0150  0.299
August  -0.2158***  -5.530  0.0401  1.273  0.1002*  1.707  0.0248  0.315  -0.0112  -0.230
September  -0.1935***  -4.710  -0.0832***  -2.643  0.0102  0.174  0.0084  0.106  -0.0201  -0.422
October  0.0397  1.005  -0.0589**  -1.855  -0.0567  -0.977  0.0657  0.825  -0.0267  -0.564
November  0.1168***  3.172  -0.0188  -0.604  -0.0091  -0.158  -0.0663  -0.830  0.0257  0.544
Adjusted R-
squared  0.3708  0.2548  0.379829  0.1686  0.3273
S.E. of regression
1  0.1420  0.1185  0.218147  0.3025  0.1828
Source. Computed by author.  One asterisk denotes significance at the  10 %  level, two asterisks denote
significance at 5%, and three asterisks denote significance at 1%.36
Table 8. Coefficients  of variation and correlation  matrix of  domestic  real prices.
Coefficient  Maize  Cassava  Groundnut  Plantain  Onion
of variation
Maize  0.142  1.000
Cassava  0.303  0.097  1.000
Groundnut  0.118  0.094  1.000
Plantain  0.218  1.000
Onion  0.183  0.121  0.088  1.000
Source. Computed by author.
Table 9. Actuarially fair premium for a  minimum price insurance contract  for cocoa  at different
strike prices. A11 figures are expressed as percent of the ex  ected future price
Strike price  as percent of expected (futures) price
Months before  -10  -5  0  5  10
contract expiration
1  0.20  0.88  2.66  5.86  10.16
2  0.88  2.04  4.05  7.00  10.80
3  1.59  2.98  5.07  7.92  11.47
4  2.22  3.74  5.87  8.66  12.06
5  2.77  4.38  6.54  9.28  12.57
6  3.27  4.93  7.11  9.81  13.03
7  3.71  5.42  7.61  10.28  13.43
8  4.11  5.85  8.04  10.69  13.79
9  4.47  6.24  8.43  11.06  14.11
10  4.80  6.59  8.78  11.39  14.40
11  5.10  6.90  9.10  11.69  14.67
12  5.38  7.19  9.38  11.95  14.90
Source. Computed by author.37
Table  10.  Comparison  of actual  cocoa  put option  prices  at the New  York  Board  of Trade  and
actuarially fair insurance  premiums from model for three months  ahead.  All prices  expressed  as
shares of future prices)
Strike  Model  Difference
Price  Put  computed  Difference  Actual
Relative to  pt  actuarially  Actual  put
Futures  Strike  futures  ption actuair  put  option-
price  price  price (%  price as  fair  option-  Model (%
($/mt)  ($/mt)  deviation  share of  insurance  Model (%  Mof a  l
from  fuue  rc  %of  futures  of actual
futur)e  price  of futures  pre)  put option
future)price  price)  price)
Cocoa put option prices NYBOT June 5, 2002
Three months ahead (September 2002)
1552  1450  -6.51  2.58  2.52  0.06  2.34
1500  -3.32  3.80  3.64  0.16  4.27
1550  -0.13  5.15  5.07  0.09  1.73
1600  3.07  7.22  6.81  0.41  5.68
1650  6.26  9.34  8.85  0.49  5.23
1700  9.45  11.73  11.18  0.55  4.65
Cocoa option prices NYBOT Feb 2, 2001
Three months ahead (May 2001)
1058  950  -10.21  2.65  1.56  1.08  40.98
1000  -5.48  4.44  2.85  1.59  35.90
1050  -0.76  6.81  4.76  2.05  30.05
1100  3.97  9.83  7.36  2.47  25.16
1150  8.70  13.04  10.61  2.44  18.68
1200  13.42  16.82  14.41  2.42  14.37
Cocoa option prices NYBOT April 4, 2000
Three months ahead (July 2000)
838  700  -16.47  0.95  0.61  0.35  36.14
750  -10.50  2.03  1.50  0.53  26.04
800  -4.53  4.18  3.18  1.00  23.92
850  1.43  7.28  5.88  1.40  19.26
900  7.40  11.58  9.66  1.92  16.59
950  13.37  16.23  14.36  1.87  11.53
Source.  Computed from data in Wall Street Journal,  various issues.38
Table  11.  Comparison  of actual  cocoa  put option  prices  at the  New York  Board of Trade  and
actuarially  fair insurance  premiums  from  model for three months ahead. All  prices expressed  as
shares of future prices)
Strike Price  Put option  Model computed  Difference
Strike  Relative to  price as  actuarially fair  Actual put  Actual put
Futures price  pric  futures price  share of  insurance price  option-Model  option-Model
($/Mt ($/t)  %deviation  futures price  (%  of futures  (%  of futures  put op  atuon
from future  (%  of future  price)  price)  P  ption
______  prce  pic)price)  price)  price)
Cocoa option prices NYBOT July 5, 2000
Two months ahead (September 2000)
841  750  -10.82  0.59  0.76  -0.17  -28.45
800  -4.88  1.90  2.10  -0.20  -10.38
850  1.07  5.11  4.64  0.47  9.24
900  7.02  9.16  8.51  0.64  7.01
950  12.96  14.27  13.46  0.81  5.66
1000  18.91  19.74  19.04  0.70  3.56
Five months ahead (December 2000)
878  750  -14.58  2.05  1.77  0.28  13.68
800  -8.88  4.10  3.15  0.95  23.14
850  -3.19  6.83  5.20  1.63  23.91
900  2.51  10.25  8.00  2.25  21.94
950  8.20  14.01  11.56  2.45  17.48
1000  13.90  18.45  15.80  2.65  14.37
Cocoa  option prices NYBOT July 2,1999
Two months ahead (September  1999)
1048  950  -9.35  1.34  1.00  0.33  24.95
1000  -4.58  2.39  2.20  0.19  7.98
1050  0.19  4.77  4.18  0.59  12.41
1100  4.96  7.82  7.03  0.79  10.13
1150  9.73  11.55  10.67  0.88  7.67
1200  14.50  15.55  14.87  0.69  4.438
Five months ahead (December,l999)  e
1084  950  -12.36  3.04  2.24  0.81  26.54
1000  -7.75  4.52  3.50  1.02  22.51
1050  -3.14  6.46  5.22  1.24  19.13
1100  1.48  8.76  7.44  1.33  15.1
1150  6.09  11.90  10.16  1.75  14.67
1200  10.70  15.41  13.34  2.06  13.38
Source. Computed from data in  Wall  Street Journal, various issues.39
Table  12.  Coefficient  of variation  of  income  of  Ghanaian  cocoa  producing  households  due  to
agricultural  uncertainties (all figure in percentage)
Share of cocoa in household  income
0-20%  20-40%  >40%
Share of agriculture in household  Share of agriculture in household income  Share of agriculture  in household
income  income
<60%  >60%  <60%  >60%  <60%  >60%
Por  Nonr  |Pon  Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Po r  o Poor  Poor  1 oorPoor
Rural forest
4.9  3.7  10.1  9.7  12.0  12.0  15.7  14.9  19.0  21.l  24.4  25.8
Other rural
5.6  3.7  9.4  9.7  NA  15.8  18.4  13.6  19.2  NA  28.0  22.7
Urban
4.0  1.2  13.0  13.1  13.4  10.7  14.4  12.4  NA  NA  31.5  27.4
Source. Computed by author.
Note. A NA for a group means that there  no households  in the relevant  class40
Table 13. WTP (as share of cocoa  income) of Ghanaian cocoa  producing households  in rural forest
region for cocoa  rice insurance at various levels
Share of cocoa  in household  income
0-200%o  20-40%  >40%
Share of agriculture in household income  Share of agriculture  in household income  Share of agriculture  in household income
<60%  >60%  <60%  >60%  <60%  >60%
Poor  Non-Poot  Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Non  Poor  Non-Poor
______________________  ________  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Poor
Number  of households  18668  50048  47133  106948  3983  11068  23540  64912  979  2855  23017  58395
Share of total income from
cocoa (%)  6.8  6.1  8.6  8.9  26.4  26.1  31.7  28.6  42.2  46.8  53.5  56.6
Strike pece  relative to  WTP  (share of cocoa income) for price insurance  for a fixed  100% of average  production  with theta=0.2  and 6 months in advance
future  expected  ptice (%)
10.00  13.5  13.3  14.6  14.5  13.8  13.8  14.1  14.1  14.3  14.4  14.7  14.8
5.00  10.3  10.1  11.4  11.2  10.6  10.6  10.9  10.9  11.1  11.2  11.4  11.5
0.00  7.6  7.4  8.7  8.5  7.9  7.9  8.2  8.2  8.3  8.5  8.7  8.8
-5.00  5.4  5.2  6.5  6.4  5.7  5.7  6.0  6.0  6.1  6.3  6.5  6.6
-10.00  3.8  3.6  4.9  4.7  4.0  4.0  4.3  4.4  4.5  4.6  4.8  4.9
WTP  (share of cocoa income) for price insurance for  a fixed  100% of average production with theta=0.2  and 12 months in advance
10.00  15.4  15.2  16.5  16.3  15.8  15.8  16.1  16.1  16.2  16.4  16.6  16.7
5.00  12.5  12.3  13.6  13.4  12.8  12.8  13.1  13.1  13.3  13.4  13.7  13.8
0.00  9.9  9.7  11.0  10.8  10.2  10.2  10.5  10.5  10.7  10.8  11.1  11.2
-5.00  7.7  7.5  8.8  8.6  8.0  8.0  8.3  8.3  8.5  8.6  8.8  8.9
-10.00  5.9  5.7  7.0  6.8  6.2  6.2  6.5  6.5  6.6  6.8  7.0  7.1
WTP  (share of cocoa income)  for price insurance for a fixed  100%  of average production  with theta=l  and 6 months in advance
10.00  15.5  14.6  21.1  20.2  17.0  17.0  18.6  18.6  19.3  20.0  21.2  21.6
5.00  12.3  11.4  17.8  16.9  13.8  13.8  15.4  15.4  16.0  16.7  17.9  18.4
0.00  9.5  8.7  15.1  14.2  11.0  11.0  12.6  12.6  13.2  13.9  15.1  15.6
-5.00  7.4  6.5  12.9  12.0  8.8  8.8  10.4  10.4  11.0  11.7  12.8  13.3
-10.00  5.7  4.8  11.2  10.3  7.1  7.1  8.7  8.7  9.3  9.9  11.0  11.5
WTP (share of cocoa  income) for price insurance for a fixed  100% of average production  with theta=1  and  12 months in advance
10.00  17.4  16.6  23.0  22.1  19.2  19.2  20.8  20.8  21.6  22.3  23.5  24.1
5.00  14.5  13.6  20.1  19.2  16.2  16.2  17.8  17.8  18.5  19.3  20.5  21.0
0.00  11.9  11.0  17.5  16.6  13.5  13.5  15.1  15.1  15.9  16.6  17.8  18.3
-5.00  9.7  8.8  15.2  14.4  11.3  11.3  12.9  12.9  13.6  14.3  15.5  16.0
-10.00  7.8  7.0  13.4  12.5  9.4  9.4  11.0  11.0  11.7  12.4  13.5  14.0
WTP (share of cocoa income) for price insurance for a fixed  100%/6 of average production  vith theta=-2.4 and 6 months  in advance
10.00  17.7  16.1  28.2  26.5  20.7  20.7  23.7  23.7  25.1  26.4  28.7  29.6
5.00  14.4  12.8  24.9  23.2  17.4  17.4  20.4  20.4  21.7  23.0  25.3  26.2
0.00  11.7  10.1  22.2  20.5  14.6  14.6  17.6  17.6  18.9  20.2  22.4  23.3
-5.00  9.5  7.9  20.0  18.3  12.3  12.3  15.3  15.3  16.5  17.8  19.9  20.8
-10.00  7.8  6.2  18.3  16.6  10.6  10.5  13.5  13.5  14.6  15.9  18.0  18.9
WTP (share  of cocoa  income)  for price insurance  for a fixed  100%  of average production  with theta=2.4 and  12 months  in advance
10.00  19.7  18.1  30.2  28.6  23.2  23.2  26.3  26.3  27.9  29.4  31.8  32.8
5.00  16.7  15 .1  27.2  25.6  20.2  20.1  23.3  23.2  24.8  26.2  28.6  29.5
0.00  14.1  12.5  24.6  22.9  17.4  17.4  20.5  20.5  22.0  23.4  25.7  26.7
-5.00  11.9  10.3  22.4  20.7  15.1  15.1  18.1  18.1  19.5  20.9  23.2  24.2
-10.00  10.0  8.4  20.5  18.8  13.1  13.1  16.1  16.1  17.5  18.8  21.1  22.0
Source.  Computed by author41
Table 14. WTP (as share of cocoa  income)  of Ghanaian cocoa  producing households  in other rural
regions for cocoa  price insurance at various levels
Share of cocoa  in household  income
0-200/o  20-40%  >40%
Share of agriculture in household  income  Share of agriculture  in household  income  Share of agriculture in household income
<600%  >60%  <600/%  >60/o  <60%  >60%
Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Non-Poor
Number of households  6957  14251  8975J  11411  0  1980  389  2279  643  0  2421  1031
Share of total income from
cocoa (%)  5.8  2.6  10.6  6.6  0.0  35.1  37.6  23.1  42.5  0.0  61.6  48.5
Strike pece relative to  WTP (share of cocoa income)  for price insurance for a fixed  100% of average production with theta=0.2  and 6 months in advance
future expected price  (%)  _
10.00  13.8  13.8  14.2  15.0  14.1  14.3  14.2  14.3  14.9  14.6
5.00  10.5  10.5  10.9  11.7  10.9  11.1  10.9  11.1  11.7  11.3
0.00  7.8  7.8  8.2  9.0  8.1  8.4  8.2  8.4  8.9  8.6
-5.00  5.7  5.7  6.0  6.9  5.9  6.2  6.0  6.2  6.7  6.4
-10.00  4.0  4.0  4.4  5.2  4.3  4.5  4.4  4.5  5.1  4.8
WTP  (share of cocoa  income) for price insurance for a fixed 100%  of average production  with theta=0.2 and  12 months in advance
10.00  15.6  15.6  16.0  16.8  16.0  16.3  16.1  16.2  16.9  16.5
5.00  12.7  12.7  13.1  13.9  13.1  13.3  13.1  13.3  13.9  13.6
0.00  10.1  10.1  10.5  11.3  10.5  10.7  10.5  10.7  11.3  11.0
-5.00  7.9  7.9  8.3  9.1  8.3  8.5  8.3  8.5  9.1  8.8
-10.00  6.1  6.1  6.5  7.3  . 6.4  6.7  6.5  6.6  7.3  6.9
WTP (share  of cocoa  income) for price insurance for a fixed  100/o of average production  with theta=l  and  6 months in advance
10.00  16.7  16.7  18.7  22.7  18.3  19.5  18.7  19.4  22.4  20.8
5.00  13.4  13.4  15.4  19.5  15.0  16.3  15.4  16.1  19.1  17.5
0.00  10.7  10.7  12.7  16.8  12.3  13.5  12.7  13.3  16.3  14.7
-5.00  8.5  8.5  10.5  14.6  10.0  11.3  10.5  11.1  14.0  12.4
-10.00  6.9  6.9  8.8  12.9  8.3  9.5  8.8  9.3  12.2  10.7
WTP  (share of cocoa income) for price insurance for a fixed  100% of average production  with theta-l  and 12 months in advance
10.00  18.6  18.5  20.6  24.6  20.5  21.8  20.8  21.6  24.8  23.1
5.00  15.6  15.6  17.7  21.7  17.5  18.7  17.8  18.6  21.8  20.1
0.00  13.0  13.0  15.1  19.1  14.8  16.1  15.2  15.9  19.1  17.4
-5.00  10.8  10.8  12.8  16.9  12.5  13.8  12.9  13.7  16.7  15.1
-10.00  9.0  9.0  11.0  15.0  10.6  11.9  11.0  11.7  14.8  13.1
WTP (share of cocoa  income) for price insurance for a fixed  100/o of average production  with theta=2.4 and 6 months in advance
10.00  19.9  19.8  23.7  31.2  23.1  25.5  23.8  25.2  31.0  27.9
5.00  16.6  16.6  20.4  28.0  19.8  22.2  20.5  21.9  27.6  24.5
0.00  13.9  13.9  17.7  25.2  16.9  19.3  17.7  19.0  24.6  21.6
-5.00  11.7  11.7  15.4  23.0  14.6  17.0  15.4  16.6  22.2  19.2
-10.00  10.0  10.0  13.7  21.3  12.8  15.1  13.7  14.8  20.2  17.3
WTP (share ofcocoa income) for price  insurance for a fixed  1000% of average production  with theta=2.4 and  12 months in advance
10.00  21.9  21.8  25.8  33.2  25.8  28.2  26.2  28.1  34.3  30.9
5.00  18.9  18.8  22.8  30.3  22.7  25.1  23.1  24.9  31.1  27.7
0.00  16.3  16.2  20.1  27.6  19.9  22.3  20.4  22.1  28.2  24.9
-5.00  14.1  14.0  17.9  25.4  17.5  19.9  18.1  19.7  25.6  22.4
-10.00  12.2  12.2  16.0  23.6  15.5  17.9  16.2  17.6  23.4  20.3
Source. Computed by author42
Table  15. WTP (as share of cocoa  income)  of Ghanaian cocoa producing households  in urban
regions  for cocoa  rice insurance at various levels
Share of cocoa in household  income
0-20%  20-40%  >400/o
Share of agriculture in household  income  Share of agriculture in household income  Share of agriculture in household  income
<60%  >60%  <
60
0/o  >60%  <60%  >60%
Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Non-  Poor  Non-Poor
Number of households  5254  10081  4140  3273  411  1719  4409  5014  0  0  2227  3378
Share of total income from
cocoa  (%)  7.8  2.3  12.4  3.6  26.4  23.5  26.4  24.8  0.0  0.0  70.0  60 7
Strike pece relative  to  WTP  (share of cocoa income) for price insurance  for a fixed  100I/0 of average production  with theta=0.2  and 6 months in advance
future expected price (/%)
10.00  13.3  13.1  14.9  19.5  14.0  13.7  14.2  13.9  15.1  14.8
5.00  10.1  9.9  11.7  16.3  10.8  10.5  10.9  10.7  11.9  11.6
0.00  7.4  7.2  9.0  13.6  8.1  7.8  8.2  8.0  9.2  8.9
-5.00  5.2  5.0  6.8  11.4  5.9  5.6  6.0  5.8  7.0  6.7
-10.00  3.6  3.4  5.1  9.7  4.2  3.9  4.4  4.1  5.3  5.0
WTP (share of cocoa income)  for price insurance for a fixed  1000/6 of average production  with theta=0.2  and  12 months in advance
10.00  15.2  15.0  16.8  21.4  15.9  15.7  16.1  15.8  17.1  16.8
5.00  12.3  12.1  13.8  18.4  13.0  12.7  13.1  12.9  14.1  13.9
0.00  9.7  9.5  11.3  15.9  10.4  10.1  10.5  10.3  11.5  11.3
-5.00  7.5  7.3  9.1  13.7  8.2  7.9  8.3  8.1  9.3  9.0
-10.00  5.7  5.5  7.2  11.9  6.4  6.1  6.5  6.3  7.5  7.2
WTP (share of cocoa income) for price insurance for a fixed  1000/o  of average  prGducfion with  theta=l1  and 6 months in advance
10.00  14.5  13.5  22.3  45.4  17.9  16.6  18.6  17.5  23.5  22.1
5.00  11.3  10.3  19.1  42.2  14.7  13.3  15.4  14.3  20.2  18.l
0.00  8.6  7.6  16.4  39.5  11.9  10.6  12.6  11.5  17.3  16.0
-5.00  6.4  5.4  14.2  37.3  9.7  8.4  10.4  9.3  15.0  13.7
-10.00  4.7  3.7  12.5  35.6  8.0  6.7  8.7  7.6  13.2  12.0
WTP  (share of cocoa income) for price insurance  for a fixed  100%  of average production  with theta=l  and  12 months in advance
10.00  16.4  15.4  24.3  47.3  20.1  18.7  20.8  19.6  26.0  24.6
5.00  13.5  12.4  21.3  44.4  17.1  15.7  17.8  16.6  22.9  21.5
0.00  10.9  9.9  18.7  41.8  14.4  13.1  15.1  14.0  20.2  18.8
-5.00  8.7  7.7  16.5  39.6  12.2  10.8  12.9  11.7  17.8  16.5
-10.00  6.9  5.9  14.7  37.8  10.3  8.9  11.0  9.9  15.8  14.5
WTP (share of cocoa income) for price insurance  for a fixed  100%  of average  production with theta=2.4 and 6 months in advance
10.00  15.8  13.9  30.5  73.8  22.4  19.8  23.7  21.6  33.1  30.5
5.00  12.6  10.7  27.3  70.5  19.1  16.6  20.4  18.3  29.7  27.1
0.00  9.9  8.0  24.5  67.8  16.3  13.8  17.6  15.5  26.7  24.2
-5.00  7.7  5.8  22.3  65.6  14.0  11.5  15.3  13.2  24.2  21.7
-10.00  6.0  4.1  20.6  63.9  12.2  9.7  13.5  11.4  22.2  19.8
WTP  (share of cocoa income) for price insurance for a fixed 1000/o  of average production  with theta=2.4 and  12 months in advance
10.00  17.9  15.9  32.7  75.7  24.9  22.3  26.2  24.0  36.6  33.8
5.00  14.9  12.9  29.7  72.7  21.8  19.2  23.1  21.0  33.3  30.6
0.00  12.3  10.3  27.0  70.2  19.1  16.5  20.4  18.3  30.4  27.7
-5.00  10.1  8.1  24.8  67.9  16.8  14.2  18.1  15.9  27.8  25.1
-10.00  8.2  6.3  22.9  66.1  14.8  12.2  16.1  14.0  25.5  22.9
Source.  Computed by author43
Table 16. WTP (share of total income)  of Ghanaian cocoa producing households  in rural forest
region for cocoa price insurance at various levels
Share of cocoa in household  income
0-20%  20-40%  >40%
Share of agriculture in household  income  Share of agriculture  in household income  Share of agriculture in household income
<60%  >60%  <60%  >600/o  <60%  >60%
Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Non-Poor
Number of households  18668  50048  47133  106948  3983  11068  23540  64912  979  2855  23017  58395
Share of total income  from
cocoa (%)  6.8  6.1  8.6  8.9  26.4  26.1  31.7  28.6  42.2  46.8  53.5  56.6
Strike price relative to  WTP (share o  total income) for pne  insurance for a fixed  100% of average production with theta=0;2 and 6 months in advance
future expected price  (%)  _  (
10.00  0.9  0.8  1.3  1.3  3.7  3.6  4.5  4.0  6.0  6.8  7.8  8.3
5.00  0.7  0.6  1.0  1.0  2.8  2.8  3.5  3.1  4.7  5.2  6.1  6.5
0.00  0.5  0.5  0.8  0.8  2.1  2.1  2.6  2.3  3.5  4.0  4.7  5.0
-5.00  0.4  0.3  0.6  0.6  1.5  1.5  1.9  1.7  2.6  2.9  3.5  3.7
-10.00  0.3  0.2  0.4  0.4  1.1  1.1  1.4  1.2  1.9  2.2  2.6  2.8
WTP (share of total income)  for price insurance for a fixed  100% of average  production with theta=0.2  and 12 months in advance
10.00  1.0  0.9  1.4  1.4  4.2  4.1  5.1  4.6  6.8  7.7  8.9  9.5
5.00  0.8  0.7  1.2  1.2  3.4  3.3  4.2  3.8  5.6  6.3  7.3  7.8
0.00  0.7  0.6  0.9  1.0  2.7  2.7  3.3  3.0  4.5  5.1  5.9  6.3
-5.00  0.5  0.5  0.8  0.8  2.1  2.1  2.6  2.4  3.6  4.0  4.7  5.1
-10.00  0.4  0.3  0.6  0.6  1.6  1.6  2.1  1.9  2.8  3.2  3.7  4.0
WTP (share of total  income) for price insurance for a fixed  100%/6 of average production  with theta=l  and 6 months in advance
10.00  1.0  0.9  1.8  1.8  4.5  4.5  5.9  5.3  8.1  9.4  11.3  12.2
5.00  0.8  0.7  1.5  1.5  3.6  3.6  4.9  4.4  6.8  7.8  9.6  10.4
0.00  0.6  0.5  1.3  1.3  2.9  2.9  4.0  3.6  5.6  6.5  8.1  8.8
-5.00  0.5  0.4  1.1  1.1  2.3  2.3  3.3  3.0  4.6  5.5  6.8  7.5
-10.00  0.4  0.3  1.0  0.9  1.9  1.9  2.7  2.5  3.9  4.6  5.9  6.5
WTP (share  of total income) for price insurance  for a fixed  100% of average production  with theta= I and  12 months  in advance
10.00  1.2  1.0  2.0  2.0  5.1  5.0  6.6  5.9  9.1  10.4  12.6  13.6
5.00  1.0  0.8  1.7  1.7  4.3  4.2  5.6  5.1  7.8  9.0  11.0  11.9
0.00  0.8  0.7  1.5  1.5  3.6  3.5  4.8  4.3  6.7  7.8  9.5  10.4
-5.00  0.7  0.5  1.3  1.3  3.0  2.9  4.1  3.7  5.7  6.7  8.3  9.0
-10.00  0.5  0.4  1.2  1.1  2.5  2.5  3.5  3.1  4.9  5.8  7.2  7.9
WTP  (share of total income)  for price insurance for a fixed  100% of average production  with theta=2.4  and 6 months in advance
10.00  1.2  1.0  2.4  2.3  5.5  5.4  7.5  6.8  10.6  12.4  15.3  16.7
5.00  1.0  0.8  2.1  2.1  4.6  4.6  6.5  5.8  9.2  10.8  13.5  14.8
0.00  0.8  0.6  1.9  1.8  3.9  3.8  5.6  5.0  8.0  9.4  12.0  13.2
-5.00  0.6  0.5  1.7  1.6  3.3  3.2  4.8  4.4  7.0  8.3  10.7  11.8
-10.00  0.5  0.4  1.6  1.5  2.8  2.8  4.3  3.9  6.2  7.4  9.6  10.7
WTP (share of total income) for price insurance for a fixed 100% of average production  with theta=2.4  and 12 months in advance
10.00  1.3  1.1  2.6  2.5  6.1  6.1  8.4  7.5  11.8  13.8  17.0  18.5
5.00  1.1  0.9  2.3  2.3  5.3  5.3  7.4  6.6  10.4  12.3  15.3  16.7
0.00  1.0  0.8  2.1  2.0  4.6  4.5  6.5  5.9  9.3  10.9  13.7  15.1
-5.00  0.8  0.6  1.9  1.8  4.0  3.9  5.8  5.2  8.2  9.8  12.4  13.7
-10.00  0.7  0.5  1.8  1.7  3.5  3.4  5.1  4.6  7.4  8.8  11.3  12.4
Source. Comnputed by author44
Table 17.  WTP (share of total income) of Ghanaian cocoa  producing households  in other rural
regions for cocoa  rice insurance at various levels
Share of cocoa in household  income
0-20%  20-40%  >40%
Share of agriculture  in household  income  Share of agriculture in household income  Share of agriculture in household income
<60%  >60%  <600/o  >60%  <60%  >60%
Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Non-Poor
Number of households  6957  14251  8975  11411  0  1980  389  2279  643  0  2421  1031
Share of total income  from
cocoa  (%)  5.8  2.6  10.6  6.6  0.0  35.1  37.6  23.1  42.5  0.0  61.6  48.5
future  expected  price (t)  WTP (share of total income) for price insurance  for a fixed  100% of average production  with theta=0.2  and 6 months in advance
10.00  0.8  0.4  1.5  1.0  0.0  4.9  5.4  3.3  6.1  0.0  9.2  7.1
5.00  0.6  0.3  1.2  0.8  0.0  3.8  4.2  2.5  4.7  0.0  7.2  5.5
0.00  0.5  0.2  0.9  0.6  0.0  2.9  3.2  1.9  3.5  0.0  5.5  4.2
-5.00  0.3  0.1  0.6  0.5  0.0  2.1  2.3  1.4  2.6  0.0  4.2  3.1
-10.00  0.2  0.1  0.5  0.3  0.0  1.5  1.7  1.0  1.9  0.0  3.1  2.3
WTP  (share of total income) for price insurance  for a fixed  100% of average production  with theta=0.2 and 12 months in advance
10.00  0.9  0.4  1.7  1.1  0.0  5.6  6.1  3.7  6.9  0.0  10.4  8.0
5.00  0.7  0.3  1.4  0.9  0.0  4.6  5.0  3.0  5.6  0.0  8.6  6.6
0.00  0.6  0.3  1.1  0.7  0.0  3.7  4.0  2.4  4.5  0.0  7.0  5.3
-5.00  0.5  0.2  0.9  0.6  0.0  2.9  3.2  1.9  3.6  0.0  5.6  4.3
-10.00  0.4  0.2  0.7  0.5  0.0  2.3  2.5  1.5  2.8  0.0  4.5  3.4
WTP  (share oftotal income)  for price insurance  for a fixed  100% of average production  with theta=l  and 6 months in advance
10.00  1.0  0.4  2.0  1.5  0.0  6.4  7.3  4.3  8.2  0.0  13.8  10.1
5.00  0.8  0.3  1.6  1.3  0.0  5.3  6.1  3.6  6.8  0.0  1  1.8  8.5
0.00  0.6  0.3  1.4  1.1  0.0  4.3  5.1  2.9  5.7  0.0  10.0  6.0
-5.00  0.5  0.2  1.1  1.0  0.0  3.5  4.2  2.4  4.7  0.0  8.6  6.0
-10.00  0.4  0.2  0.9  0.8  0.0  2.9  3.6  2.0  4.0  0.0  7.5  5.2
WTP  (share of total income) for price insurance for a fixed  100% ofaverage producton  with theta=l  and 12 months in advance
10.00  1.1  0.5  2.2  1.6  0.0  7.2  8.2  4.8  9.2  0.0  15.3  11.2
5.00  0.9  0.4  1.9  1.4  0.0  6.1  7.0  4.1  7.9  0.0  13.4  9.7
0.00  0.8  0.3  1.6  1.3  0.0  5.2  6.0  3.5  6.8  0.0  11.7  8.4
-5.00  0.6  0.3  1.4  1.1  0.0  4.4  5.2  3.0  5.8  0.0  10.3  7.3
-10.00  0.5  0.2  1.2  1.0  0.0  3.7  4.5  2.6  5.0  0.0  9.1  6.4
WTP (share of total income) for price insurance  for a fixed  100% of average  production with theta=2.4 and 6 months in advance
10.00  1.2  0.5  2.5  2.1  0.0  8.1  9.6  5.5  10.7  0.0  19.1  13.5
5.00  1.0  0.4  2.2  1.8  0.0  6.9  8.3  4.7  9.3  0.0  17.0  11.9
0.00  0.8  0.4  1.9  1.7  0.0  5.9  7.3  4.1  8.1  0.0  15.2  10.5
-5.00  0.7  0.3  1.6  1.5  0.0  5.1  6.4  3.6  7.1  0.0  13.7  9.3
-10.00  0.6  0.3  1.5  1.4  0.0  4.5  5.7  3.2  6.3  0.0  12.5  8.4
WTP (share of total income) for price insurance for a fixed  100% of average production  with theta=2.4 and  12 months  in advance
10.00  1.3  0.6  2.7  2.2  0.0  9.0  10.6  6.1  11.9  0.0  21.1  15.0
5.00  1.1  0.5  2.4  2.0  0.0  8.0  9.4  5.4  10.6  0.0  19.1  13.4
0.00  0.9  0.4  2.1  1.8  0.0  7.0  8.4  4.7  9.4  0.0  17.4  12.1
-5.00  0.8  0.4  1.9  1.7  0.0  6.1  7.5  4.2  8.4  0.0  15.8  10.9
-10.00  0.7  0.3  1.7  1.5  0.0  5.4  6.7  3.7  7.5  0.0  14.4  9.8
Source. Computed by author45
Table 18. WTP (share of total income)  of Ghanaian cocoa  producing households  in urban regions
for cocoa  price insurance at various levels
Share of cocoa in household income
0-20%  20-40%  >40%
Share of agriculture in household income  Share of agriculture in household income  Share of agriculture  in household income
<60%  >60%  <60%  >600/o  <60%  >60%
Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  Non-Poor
Number of households  5254  10081  4140  3273  411  1719  4409  5014  0  0  2227  3378
Share of total income from
cocoa (%)  7.8  2.3  12.4  3.6  26.4  26.4  26.4  24.8  0.0  0.0  70.0  60.7
Strike price relative to  WTP (share of total  income) for price insurance  for a fixed 100% of average production  with theta=0.2 and  6 months in advance
future expected price (%/)
10.00  1.0  0.3  1.8  0.7  3.7  3.2  3.7  3.5  0.0  0.0  10.6  9.0
5.00  0.8  0.2  1.4  0.6  2.8  2.5  2.9  2.7  0.0  0.0  8.3  7.0
0.00  0.6  0.2  1.1  0.5  2.1  1.8  2.2  2.0  0.0  0.0  6.4  5.4
-5.00  0.4  0.1  0.8  0.4  1.6  1.3  1.6  1.4  0.0  0.0  4.9  4.1
-10.00  0.3  0.1  0.6  0.3  1.1  0.9  1.1  1.0  0.0  0.0  3.7  3.0
WTP (share  of total income)  for price insurance for a fixed  100% of average production  with theta=0.2  and  12 months in advance
10.00  1.2  0.3  2.1  0.8  4.2  3.7  4.2  3.9  0.0  0.0  12.0  10.2
5.00  1.0  0.3  1.7  0.7  3.4  3.0  3.5  3.2  0.0  0.0  9.9  8.4
0.00  0.8  0.2  1.4  0.6  2.7  2.4  2.8  2.6  0.0  0.0  8.1  6.8
-5.00  0.6  0.2  1.1  0.5  2.2  1.9  2.2  2.0  0.0  0.0  6.5  5.5
-10.00  0.4  0.1  0.9  0.4  1.7  1.4  1.7  1.6  0.0  0.0  5.2  4.4
WTP (share of total income)  for price insurance  for a fixed  100% of average production  with theta=l  and  6 months in advance
10.00  1.1  0.3  2.8  1.6  4.7  3.9  4.9  4.3  0.0  0.0  16.4  13.4
5.00  0.9  0.2  2.4  1.5  3.9  3.1  4.1  3.5  0.0  0.0  14.1  11.4
0.00  0.7  0.2  2.0  1.4  3.2  2.5  3.3  2.9  0.0  0.0  12.1  9.7
-5.00  0.5  0.1  1.8  1.3  2.6  2.0  2.7  2.3  0.0  0.0  10.5  8.3
-10.00  0.4  0.1  1.5  1.3  2.1  1.6  2.3  1.9  0.0  0.0  9.3  7.3
WTP (share of total income) for price insurance  for a fixed  100% of average  production  with theta=l  and  12 months in advance
10.00  1.3  0.4  3.0  1.7  5.3  4.4  5.5  4.9  0.0  0.0  18.2  14.9
5.00  1.1  0.3  2.6  1.6  4.5  3.7  4.7  4.1  0.0  0.0  16.0  13.1
0.00  0.9  0.2  2.3  1.5  3.8  3.1  4.0  3.5  0.0  0.0  14.1  11.4
-5.00  0.7  0.2  2.1  1.4  3.2  2.5  3.4  2.9  0.0  0.0  12.5  10.0
-10.00  0.5  0.1  1.8  1.3  2.7  2.1  2.9  2.4  0.0  0.0  11.1  8.8
WTP (share of total income)  for price insurance for a fixed  100% of average production  with  theta=2.4 and  6 months in advance
10.00  1.2  0.3  3.8  2.6  5.9  4.7  6.3  5.4  0.0  0.0  23.2  18.5
5.00  1.0  0.2  3.4  2.5  5.0  3.9  5.4  4.5  0.0  0.0  20.8  16.4
0.00  0.8  0.2  3.0  2.4  4.3  3.2  4.7  3.8  0.0  0.0  18.7  14.7
-5.00  0.6  0.1  2.8  2.3  3.7  2.7  4.0  3.3  0.0  0.0  16.9  13.2
-10.00  0.5  0.1  2.6  2.3  3.2  2.3  3.6  2.8  0.0  0.0  15.5  12.0
WTP (share of total income) for price insurance for a fixed  100% of average production  with theta=2.4 and  12 months in advance
10.00  1.4  0.4  4.1  2.7  6.6  5.2  6.9  6.0  0.0  0.0  25.6  20.5
5.00  1.2  0.3  3.7  2.6  5.8  4.5  6.1  5.2  0.0  0.0  23.3  18.5
0.00  1.0  0.2  3.4  2.5  5.0  3.9  5.4  4.5  0.0  0.0  21.3  16.8
-5.00  0.8  0.2  3.1  2.4  4.4  3.3  4.8  4.0  0.0  0.0  19.4  15.2
-10.00  0.6  0.1  2.8  2.4  3.9  2.9  4.3  3.5  0.0  0.0  17.9  13.9
Source.  Comnputed by author46
Table  19. Proportions of the WTP that is accounted  for by WTPo , the unconditional variance and
the terms with conditional the expectations (all figures are in percent of WTP except where noted)
Rural forest
Share of cocoa in household income
0-200%  20-40%  >40%
Share of agriculture  in household  income  Share of agriculture in household income  Share of agriculture in household  income
<60(%  >600%  <600/o  >600/  f  <60%  >60%
Poor  I Non-Poor  Poor  I Non-Poor  Poor  I Non-Poor  Poor  Non-Poor  Poor  I Non-Poor  Poor  Non-Poor
Price insurance  for fixed  1000/0 of average production wvith theta =1 and 6 months advance for strike price 0% from expected  future
price
WTP (share of  total
income)  0.6  0.5  1.3  1.3  2.9  2.9  4.0  3.6  5.6  6.5  8.1  8.8
WTPO  74.5  81.8  47.0  50.0  64.4  64.4  56.4  56.3  53.7  51.1  47.1  45.7
Uncond.  Variance term  24.8  17.5  52.4  49.3  33.1  33.0  40.9  41.3  42.9  45.3  49.1  50.4
Conditional temis  0.8  0.7  0.6  0.7  2.6  2.5  2.7  2.4  3.4  3.6  3.8  3.9
Price insurance  for fixed  1000/0  of average production  with theta =1  and 12 months advance for strike price 0 from expected  future
price
WTP (share of  total
income)WTP  0.8  0.7  1.5  1.5  3.6  3.5  4.8  4.3  6.7  7.8  9.5  10.4
WTPO  79.0  85.1  53.7  56.6  69.3  69.4  61.9  62.0  59.1  56.5  52.7  51.3
lJncond. Variance  term  19.9  13.8  45.3  42.4  27.0  26.9  34.1  34.4  35.8  38.1  41.6  42.8
Conditional  terms  1.1  1.1  0.9  1.0  3.7  3.7  4.0  3.6  5.1  5.4  5.7  5.9
Other  rural
Price insurance  for fixed  100%  of average production  with  theta =1  and  6 months  advance for strike price 0 from expected  future
price
WTP (share of  total
income)WTP  0.6  0.3  1.4  1.1  4.3  5.1  2.9  5.7  10.0  7.1
WTPO  66.3  66.3  56.0  42.4  58.0  52.7  56.0  53.4  43.7  48.4
Uncond.  Variance  term  33.1  33.4  43.1  57.2  38.9  44.3  42.0  43.2  52.3  48.1
Conditional  terms  0.6  0.3  0.9  0.4  3.1  3.0  2.0  3.4  4.1  3.5
Price insurance  for fixed  10
00/%  of average production  with theta  =1 and 12 months advance  for strike price 0  from expected  future
price
WTP (share  of  total
income)WTP  0.8  0.3  1.6  1.3  5.2  6.0  3.5  6.8  11.7  8.4
WTPO  71.9  72.1  62.3  49.1  63.3  58.3  61.9  58.8  49.2  54.0
Uncond.  Variance term  27.2  27.6  36.4  50.2  32.2  37.2  35.2  36.1  44.6  40.7
Conditional  terms  0.9  0.4  1.4  0.7  4.5  4.5  2.9  5.1  6.2  5.3
Urban
Price insurance for fixed  100/o of average production  with theta  =1  and 6 months advance  for strike price 0 from expected  future
price
WTP (share of  total
income)WTP  0.7  0.2  2.0  1.4  3.2  2.5  3.3  2.9  12.1  9.7
WTPO  83.1  93.8  43.5  18.0  59.6  67.2  56.2  61.8  41.0  44.4
Uncond. Variance term  16.0  5.9  55.7  81.9  38.0  30.4  41.5  35.9  54.7  51.6
Conditional  terms  1.0  0.3  0.8  0.1  2.4  2.4  2.2  2.3  4.3  4.1
Price insurance for fixed  100% of average production with theta =1  and  12 months advance  for strike price 0 from expected  future
price
WTP (share  of  total
income)WTP  0.9  0.2  2.3  1.5  3.8  3.1  4.0  3.5  14.1  11.4
WTPO  86.1  95.1  50.1  22.5  65.0  71.9  62.0  67.1  46.4  49.9
Uncond. Variance term  12.5  4.5  48.7  77.4  31.5  24.7  34.7  29.6  46.9  43.9
Conditional  terms  1.4  0.4  1.3  0.2  3.5  3.4  3.3  3.4  6.6  6.2
Source.  Computed by author47
Table 20. Comparison of WTP and actual cocoa  put option prices in the NYBOT for a fixed  100%
of total production  and three months  in advance,  for the producers in  the rural forest  region  of
Ghana.
Rural forest
Share of cocoa in household income
0-20%  20-40%  >40%
Share of agnculture  in  Share of agriculture  in  Share of agriculture  in
household income  household income  household  income
<60%  >60%  <60%  >60%  <60%  >60%
|NPoorn  p  r  | Non-  p  |  Non-  Non-  Non-  Non-
PorPo  orPo  orPoor  Poor  Poor  Poor  Poor  Poor  Po
Date of  Strike price  Actual put
observati  in relation to  option prce  WTP with theta=0.2 and 3 months in advance
future price  (% of fuiture
on__  (%)  pnce)
-6.51  2.58  3.0  2.8  4.1  3.9  3.2  3.2  3.5  3.5  3.7  3.8  4.0  4.1
-3.32  3.80  4.1  4.0  5.2  5.1  4.4  4.4  4.7  4.7  4.8  4.9  5.2  5.3
5-Jun-02  -0.13  5.15  5.5  5.3  6.6  6.4  5.8  5.8  6.1  6.1  6.2  6.3  6.5  6.6
3.07  7.22  7.2  7.0  8.3  8.1  7.5  7.5  7.8  7.8  7.9  8.0  8.3  8.4
6.26  9.34  9.2  9.1  10.3  10.2  9.5  9.5  9.8  9.8  9.9  10.1  10.3  10.4
Date  WTP with theta-l  and 3 months in advance
-6.51  2.58  4.9  4.0  10.4  9.5  6.2  6.2  7.8  7.8  8.3  9.0  10.1  10.5
-3.32  3.80  6.0  5.2  11.6  10.7  7.4  7.4  8.9  9.0  9.5  10.2  11.3  11.7
5-Jun-02  -0.13  5.15  7.4  6.6  13.0  12.1  8.8  8.8  10.3  10.4  10.9  11.6  12.7  13.1 
3.07  7.22  9.1  8.3  14.7  13.8  10.5  10.5  12.1  12.1  12.7  13.3  14.5  14.9
6.26  9.34  11.2  10.3  16.7  15.8  12.6  12.6  14.1  14.1  14.7  15.4  16.5  17.0
Date  WTP with theta=2.4 and 3 months in advance
-6.51  2.58  7.0  5.4  17.4  15.7  9.6  9.5  12.4  12.5  13.5  14.7  16.8  17.7
-3.32  3.80  8.1  6.6  18.6  16.9  10.8  10.8  13.7  13.7  14.8  16.0  18.1  19.0
5-Jun-02  -0.13  5.15  9.5  7.9  20.0  18.3  12.2  12.2  15.1  15.1  16.2  17.4  19.6  20.4
3.07  7.22  11.3  9.7  21.7  20.0  14.0  13.9  16.9  16.9  18.0  19.3  21.4  22.2
6.26  9.34  13.3  11.7  23.7  22.0  16.0  16.0  18.9  19.0  20.1  21.3  23.5  24.4
Source. Author's computations  and Wall street Journal for put option quotes.48
Table 21. Comparison of WTP and actual cocoa  put option prices in the NYBOT  for a fixed 100%
of total  production  and  five  months  in  advance,  for  the producers  in  the rural forest  region  of
Ghana.
Rural forest
Share of cocoa in household income
0-20%  20-40%  >40%
Share of agriculture in  Share of agriculture in  Share of agriculture in
household income  household income  household income
<60%  >60%  <60%  >60%  <60%  >60%
Non-  Non-  Non-  Non-  Non-  Non-
Poor  Poor  Poor  Poor  Poor  oo  Poor  Poor  Poor  P  oor  Poor
Date of Strike price  Actual put
observa  in relation  option price  WTP with theta=0.2 and 5 months  in advance
tion  to future  (%/o  of future  W
pnce (%)  price)
-8.88  4.10  3.6  3.4  4.7  4.5  3.9  3.8  4.2  4.2  4.3  4.4.  4.6  4.7
5-Jul-  -3.19  6.83  5.6  5.4  6.7  6.5  5.9  5.9  6.2  6.2  6.3  6.4  6.7  6.8
00  2.51  10.25  8.3  8.2  9.4  9.3  8.6  8.6  8.9  8.9  9.1  9.2  9.4  9.5
8.20  14.01  11.8  11.6  12.9  12.8  12.1  12.1  12.4  12.4  12.6  12.7  12.9  13.0
13.90  18.45  16.0  15.8  17.1  16.9  16.3  16.3  16.6  16.6  16.7  16.9  17.1  17.2
Date  WTP with theta=1  and 5 months in advance
-8.88  4.10  5.5  4.6  11.1  10.2  6.9  6.9  8.4  8.5  9.0  9.7  10.8  11.3
5-Jul-  -3.19  6.83  7.5  6.7  13.1  12.2  9.0  8.9  10.5  10.5  11.1  11.8  12.9  13.4
00  2.51  10.25  10.3  9.4  15.8  14.9  11.8  11.7  13.3  13.3  13.9  14.6  15.8  16.2
8.20  14.01  13.8  12.9  19.3  18.4  15.3  15.3  16.8  16.9  17.5  18.2  19.3  19.8
13.90  18.45  17.9  17.1  23.5  22.6  19.5  19.5  21.0  21.0  21.7  22.4  23.5  24.0
Date  WTP with theta=2.4 and 5 months  in advance
-8.88  4.10  7.6  6.0  18.1  16.4  10.3  10.3  13.2  13.3  14.4  15.6  17.7  18.6
5-Jul-  -3.19  6.83  9.7  8.1  20.1  18.4  12.4  12.4  15.4  15.4  16.6  17.8  20.0  20.9
00  2.51  10.25  12.4  10.8  22.9  21.2  15.3  15.3  18.3  18.3  19.5  20.8  23.0  23.9
8.20  14.01  15.9  14.3  26.4  24.7  18.9  18.9  21.9  21.9  23.1  24.4  26.7  27.6
13.90  18.45  20.1  18.5  30.6  28.9  23.1  23.1  26.1  26.1  27.4  28.7  30.9  31.9
Source. Author's computations  and Wall street Journal for put option quotes.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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